“女士们，先生们；尊敬的庭上；尊敬的各同盟国法官们：全体被告参与了这一共同计划的拟定或执行，这一共同计划的目的，是为了日本取得对太平洋及印度洋地区国家的政治、军事、经济的控制地位！为了达到这个目的，日本单独或与其它具有同样目的的国家发动侵略战争，以对付反对此侵略目的的国家！我以及我们检查团的全体同仁，用我们的努力和证据，证明了上述目的的阴谋及罪行都确有其事！

纵观人类文明史，其手段之残忍、残酷、灭绝人性实属罕见！无数的生命痛苦地消失在日本侵略野心的枪口和刀口之下！他们的这种行为是对人类文明的挑战！是对和平的挑战！是对世界的挑战！他们共同的犯罪目的是为了确保天皇的统治地位！没有比发动和实行侵略战争更加严重的罪行！全世界人民的安全，被这种阴谋所威胁！被这场战争所破坏！这个阴谋的唯一结果，就是使全世界遭受死亡和痛苦！

所以，我——约瑟夫·季南——代表盟国检查团全体同仁郑重向远东国际军事法庭庭长及各位法官提请，请你们给这些发动和实施侵略战争的被告们以严惩！请你们以公正之心，以善良之名，以人类之愿！”

第二篇：约瑟夫奈

Joseph S Nye

The East Asian Triangle is Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard?s Kennedy School of Government and author, most recently, ofThe Power Game: A Washington Novel. His previous post on Webdiary was by Joseph S Nye

Once again, North Korea?s pursuit of nuclear weapons is threatening Asia?s stability. Japan?s new prime minister, Shinzo Abe, hastily arranged a summit in China with President Hu Jintao on the eve of North Korea?s nuclear test, a meeting that saw both men agree that such a move was "intolerable."

The meeting is a welcome development. But Abe comes into office with a reputation as a stronger nationalist than his predecessor, Junichiro Koizumi, whose insistence on visiting the controversial Yasukuni Shrine (where Class A war criminals from World War II are buried) helped sour relations with China. For stability to be preserved, Sino-Japanese relations must improve.

Although North Korea?s nuclear ambitions are worrying and destabilizing, China?s rise is the key strategic issue in East Asia. For three decades, its economy has grown by 8% to 10% annually. Its defense expenditures have an even faster pace. Yet Chinese leaders speak of China?s "peaceful rise" and "peaceful development."

Some believe that China cannot rise peacefully, and will seek hegemony in East Asia, leading to conflict with the United States and Japan. Others point out that China has engaged in "good neighbor" policies since the 1990?s, settled border disputes, played a greater role in international institutions, and recognized the benefits of using soft power.

A decade ago, I oversaw preparation of the US Pentagon?s East Asian Strategy Report, which has guided American policy under the Clinton and Bush administrations. Back then, there was a debate between those who wanted to contain China?s growing strength increased and those who urged China?s integration into the international system. Containment was unfeasible, because, unlike the Soviet Union during the Cold

War, China?s neighbors did not see it as a clear and present danger. Moreover, treating China as an enemy would ensure that it became one, thus unnecessarily ignoring the possibility of benign outcomes.

The strategy we chose was to "balance and integrate." The East Asian balance of power rested on the triangle of China, Japan, and the US. By reaffirming the

US-Japan security relationship in the Clinton-Hashimoto declaration of 1996, the US helped structure a favorable regional balance. By simultaneously encouraging China?s entry into the World Trade Organization and other institutions, we created

incentives for good behavior. So integration was hedged by realism in case things went wrong.

That strategy has largely worked. China?s military power has increased, but its

behavior has been more moderate than it was a decade ago. China is a long way from posing the kind of challenge to American preponderance that the Kaiser?s Germany posed when it surpassed Britain at the beginning of the twentieth century. The key to military power in today?s information age depends on the ability to integrate complex systems of space-based surveillance, high speed computers, and "smart" weapons. It is not likely that China (or others) will soon close that gap with the US.

Of course, the fact that China is unlikely to compete with the US on a global basis does not mean that it could not challenge the US in East Asia, or that war over Taiwan is not possible. If Taiwan were to declare independence, it is likely that China would use force, regardless of the perceived economic or military costs. But it would be unlikely to win such a war, and prudent policy on all sides can make such a war unlikely. So what is the strategic problem today? Stability in East Asia depends upon good relations between all three sides of the US-China-Japan triangle, but ties between China and Japan deteriorated in the Koizumi years. China permitted demonstrations, sometimes violent, against Japanese consulates in protest of changes in Japanese textbooks that softened descriptions of Japan?s invasion in the 1930?s. After 22 million Chinese signed a petition against Japanese membership of the United Nations Security Council, Premier Wen Jiabao announced China?s opposition to such a step. China also objected to Japanese statements about Taiwan. And there are territorial disputes about small islands and potential gas reserves near the China-Japan maritime boundary.

The most contentious issue, however, has been prime ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, and, until Abe?s visit, China had been reluctant to engage in any summit meetings with Japan so long as such visits continue. Although China has

become Japan?s largest partner in trade and foreign direct investment, nationalists in the two countries have fueled each other?s extremism, while their governments play with fire.

American interests rest on regional stability and continued growth in trade and

investment. So President George W. Bush could quietly tell Abe that we welcome good relations between Japan and China, and that prime ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine undercut Japan?s own interests in East Asia. It reminds Asians of the repulsive Japan of the 1930?s rather than the attractive Japan of today.

At the same time, the US can be cautious about involving Japan in Taiwan issues – a

neuralgic point for China – while encouraging the development of Asian institutions that increase contacts and dampen conflict. This can include the development of the East Asian Summit, revival of the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the evolution of the current six-party talks on North Korea into a permanent Northeast Asia Security Dialogue.

Fortunately, there are signs that both China and Japan are seeking to back away from the impasse of recent years. While Abe has maintained his position on Yasukuni, his summit with Chinese President Hu Jintao was a promising step forward. Some Chinese analysts, for their part, recognize the danger in stimulating too much nationalism toward Japan.

The US should quietly try to nudge these steps forward. The US-Japan alliance remains crucial to stability in East Asia, but it takes three sides to make a triangle. Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2006.

Winners and losers in the post 9/11 era

Joseph S Nye is Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard?s Kennedy School of Government and author, most recently, ofThe Power Game: A Washington Novel. by Joseph S Nye

September 11, 2001, is one of those dates that mark a transformation in world

politics. Just as the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, signified the Cold War?s end, al-Qaeda?s attack on the United States opened a new epoch. A

non-governmental group killed more Americans that day than the government of

Japan did with its surprise attack on another transformative date, December 7, 1941. While the jihadi terrorist movement had been growing for a decade, 9/11 was the turning point. Five years into this new era, how should we characterise it?

Some believe that 9/11 ushered in a “clash of civilizations” between Islam vs the West. Indeed, that is probably what Osama bin Laden had in mind. Terrorism is a form of theater. Extremists kill innocent people in order to dramatise their message in a way that shocks and horrifies their intended audience. They also rely on what Clark McCauley and others have called “jujitsu politics,” in which a smaller fighter uses the strength of the larger opponent to defeat him.

In that sense, bin Laden hoped that the US would be lured into a bloody war in Afghanistan, similar to the Soviet intervention two decades earlier, which had created such a fertile recruiting ground for jihadists. But the Americans used a

modest amount of force to remove the Taliban government, avoided disproportionate civilian casualties, and were able to create an indigenous political framework.

While far from perfect, the first round in the fight went to the US. Al-Qaeda lost the sanctuaries from which it planned its attacks; many of its leaders were killed or captured; and its central communications were severely disrupted.

Then the Bush administration succumbed to hubris and made the colossal mistake of invading Iraq without broad international support. Iraq provided the symbols, civilian casualties, and recruiting ground that the jihadi extremists had sought in

Afghanistan. Iraq was George Bush?s gift to Osama bin Laden.

Al-Qaeda lost its central organisational capacity, but it became a symbol and focal point around which like-minded imitators could rally. With the help of the Internet, its symbols and training materials became easily available around the world. Whether al-Qaeda had a direct role in the Madrid and London bombings, or the recent plot to blow up airliners over the Atlantic, is less important than the way it has been transformed into a powerful “brand.” The second round went to the extremists.

The outcome of future rounds in the struggle against jihadi terrorism will depend on our ability to avoid the trap of “jujitsu politics.” That will require more use of the soft power of attraction rather than relying so heavily on hard military power, as the Bush administration has done. For the struggle is not a clash of Islam vs the West, but a civil war within Islam between a minority of terrorists and a larger mainstream of non-violent believers.

Jihadi extremism cannot be defeated unless the mainstream wins. Military force, intelligence, and international police cooperation needs to be used against hardcore terrorists affiliated with or inspired by al-Qaeda, but soft power is essential to attracting the mainstream and drying up support for the extremists.

US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld once said that the measure of success in this war is whether the number of terrorists we are killing and deterring is larger than the number that the terrorists are recruiting. By this standard, we are doing badly. In November 2003, the official number of terrorist insurgents in Iraq was given as 5,000. This year, it was reported to be 20,000. As Brigadier General Robert Caslen, the Pentagon?s deputy director for the war on terrorism, put it, “We are not killing them faster than they are being created.”

We are also failing in the application of soft power. According to Caslen, “We in the Pentagon are behind our adversaries in the use of communication – either to recruit or train.”

The manner in which we use military power also affects Rumsfeld?s ratio. In the

aftermath of 9/11, there was a good deal of sympathy and understanding around the world for America?s military response against the Taliban. The US invasion of Iraq, a country that was not connected to the 9/11 attacks, squandered that good will, and the attractiveness of the US in Muslim countries like Indonesia plummeted from 75% approval in 2000 to half that level today. Indeed, occupying a divided nation is messy, and it is bound to produce episodes like Abu Ghraib and Haditha, which undercut America?s attractiveness not just in Iraq, but around the world.

The ability to combine hard and soft power is smart power. When the Soviet Union invaded Hungary and Czechoslovakia during the Cold War, it undercut the soft power that it had enjoyed in Europe in the aftermath of World War II. When Israel launched a lengthy bombing campaign in Lebanon last month, it created so many

civilian casualties that the early criticisms of Hezbollah by Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia became untenable in Arab politics. When terrorist excesses killed innocent

Muslim civilians such as Egyptian Islamic Jihad did in 1993 or Abu Musab al-Zarqawi did in Amman in 2005, they undercut their own soft power and lost support.

The most important lesson five years after 9/11 is that failure to combine hard and soft power effectively in the struggle against jihadi terrorism will lead us into the trap set by those who want a clash of civilizations. Muslims, including Islamists, have a diversity of views, so we need to be wary of strategies that help our enemies by uniting disparate forces behind one banner. We have a just cause and many potential allies, but our failure to combine hard and soft power into a smart strategy could be fatal.

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2006.

Is "Progressive Realism" America's Next Foreign Policy?

Joseph S Nye is Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard?s Kennedy School of Government and author, most recently, ofSoft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. His previous post on Webdiary was .

by Joseph S Nye

Polls in the United States show low public approval for President George W. Bush?s handling of foreign policy, but little agreement on what should take its place. The unbridled ambitions of the neo-conservatives and assertive nationalists in his first administration produced a foreign policy that was like a car with an accelerator, but no brakes. It was bound to go off the road.

But how should America use its unprecedented power, and what role should values play? Realists warn against letting values determine policy, but democracy and human rights have been an inherent part of American foreign policy for two centuries. The Democratic Party could solve this problem by adopting the suggestion of Robert Wright and others that it pursue "progressive realism."

A progressive realist foreign policy would start with an understanding of the strength and limits of American power. The US is the only superpower, but

preponderance is not empire or hegemony. America can influence but not control other parts of the world.

Power always depends upon context, and the context of world politics today is like a three-dimensional chess game. The top board of military power is unipolar; but on the middle board of economic relations, the world is multipolar, and on the bottom board – comprising issues like climate change, illegal drugs, Avian flu, and terrorism – power is chaotically distributed.

Military power is a small part of the solution in responding to threats on the bottom board of international relations. They require cooperation among governments and international institutions. Even on the top board (where America represents nearly half of world defense expenditures), the military is supreme in the global commons of

air, sea, and space, but more limited in its ability to control nationalistic populations in occupied areas.

A progressive realist policy would also stress the importance of developing an

integrated grand strategy that combines "hard" military power with "soft" attractive power into "smart" power of the sort that won the Cold War. America needs to use hard power against terrorists, but it cannot hope to win the struggle against terrorism unless it gains the hearts and minds of moderates. The misuse of hard power (as at Abu Ghraib or Haditha) produces new terrorist recruits.

Today, the US has no such integrated strategy. Many official instruments of soft power – public diplomacy, broadcasting, exchange programs, development assistance, disaster relief, military to military contacts – are scattered around the government, and there is no overarching policy, much less a common budget, to combine them with hard power into a coherent security strategy. The US spends roughly 500 times more on its military than it does on broadcasting and exchanges. Is this the right

proportion? And how should the government relate to non-official generators of soft power – everything from Hollywood to Harvard to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation – that emanates from civil society?

A progressive realist policy must advance the promise of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" enshrined in American tradition. Such a grand strategy would have four key pillars: (1) providing security for the US and its allies; (2) maintaining a strong domestic and international economy; (3) avoiding environmental disasters (such as pandemics and global flooding); and (4) encouraging liberal democracy and human rights at home and, where feasible, abroad.

This does not mean imposing American values by force. Democracy promotion is

better accomplished by attraction than coercion, and it takes time and patience. The US would be wise to encourage the gradual evolution of democracy, but in a manner that accepts the reality of cultural diversity.

Such a grand strategy would focus on four major threats. Probably the greatest danger is the intersection of terrorism with nuclear materials. Preventing this requires to fight terrorism and promote non-proliferation, better protection of nuclear materials, stability in the Middle East, as well as greater attention to failed states.

The second major challenge is the rise of a hostile hegemon as Asia?s share of the world economy gradually comes to match its three-fifths share of the world?s population. This requires a policy that integrates China as a responsible global

stakeholder, but hedges its bets by maintaining close relations with Japan, India, and other countries in the region.

The third major threat is an economic depression, possibly triggered by financial mismanagement, or by a crisis that disrupts oil flows from the Persian Gulf – home to two-thirds of global reserves. This will require policies that gradually reduce

dependence on oil, while recognizing that the American economy cannot be isolated from global energy markets.

The fourth major threat is ecological breakdowns, such as pandemics and climate change. This will require prudent energy policies and greater cooperation through

international institutions such as the World Health Organization.

A progressive realist policy should look to the long-term evolution of world order and realize the responsibility of the international system?s most powerful country to

produce global public or common goods. In the nineteenth century, Britain defined its national interest broadly to include promoting freedom of the seas, an open

international economy, and a stable European balance of power. Such common goods benefited both Britain and other countries. They also contributed to Britain?s legitimacy and soft power.

With the US now in Britain?s place, it should play a similar role by promoting an open international economy and commons (seas, space, Internet), mediating international disputes before they escalate, and developing international rules and institutions. Because globalization will spread technical capabilities, and information technology will allow broader participation in global communications, American preponderance will become less dominant later this century. Progressive realism requires America to prepare for that future by defining its national interest in a way that benefits all. Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2006.

Should Iran be attacked?

Joseph S Nye is Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard?s Kennedy School of Government and author, most recently, ofThe Power Game: A Washington Novel. Previous posts on Webdiary are and .

by Joseph S Nye

President George W Bush has said that Iran?s development of nuclear weapons is unacceptable, and recent press accounts suggest that his administration is exploring preventive military options. In Iran, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has defied the diplomatic efforts of the European Union and others, using the nuclear issue to stir rally domestic support. Is it too late to prevent a showdown?

Iran claims that its nuclear program is aimed solely at peaceful uses, and that it has the right to develop uranium enrichment and other technologies as a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). But it spent 18 years deceiving inspectors from the watchdog International Atomic Energy Agency, leading some countries to argue that Iran destroyed its credibility and forfeited its rights to enrichment on its own soil.

Russia has offered to provide nuclear enrichment and reprocessing services for the civilian reactor it is building in Iran. If Iran were interested solely in peaceful uses, the Russian offer or some other plan (such as placing stocks of low enriched uranium in Iran) could meet their needs. Iran?s insistence on enrichment inside the country is

widely attributed to its desire to produce highly enriched uranium for a bomb.

Would an Iranian bomb really be so bad? Some argue that it could become the basis of stable nuclear deterrence in the region, analogous to the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. But statements by Iranian leaders denying the Holocaust and urging the destruction of Israel have not only cost Iran support in Europe, but are unlikely to make Israel willing to gamble its existence on the prospect of stable deterrence.

Nor is it likely that Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and others will sit passively while the Persian Shia gain the bomb. They will likely follow suit, and the more weapons proliferate in the volatile Middle East, the more likely it is that accidents and miscalculations could lead to their use. Moreover, there are genuine fears that rogue elements in a divided Iranian government might leak weapons technology to terrorist groups.

These are the dangers that lead some to contemplate air strikes to destroy Iran?s nuclear facilities before they can make weapons. At first glance, a “surgical” strike may look tempting. But military options are less attractive when carefully analyzed. Iran?s nuclear facilities are dispersed; some are underground. If one adds

suppression of air defenses, such a strike might involve roughly 600 targets – far from surgical.

Moreover, while an air strike might set back Iran?s program by a few years, it would solidify nationalist support for the government and the nuclear program, particularly because one attack would not be enough. The process of protracted strikes could thwart positive political changes among the younger generation, thus reducing the chances of a more democratic and benign Iran emerging in the future.

At the same time, Iran has effective means of retaliation. It might not be able to close the Strait of Hormuz, but threats to refineries, storage facilities, and tankers would send oil prices even higher. Moreover, Iran?s support of terrorist organisations, such as Hezbollah, could bring violence to other countries. With the outcome of

Bush?s ill-advised war in Iraq uncertain and his legacy depending heavily upon finding a political solution, Iran?s support for Iraqi Shiite radicals could give it considerable leverage.

When Bush administration officials say that “all options are on the table,” they are warning the Iranians that the use of force is possible. But one is tempted to believe them when they add that they are now focused on diplomacy. As Theodore Roosevelt once said, negotiations may go better when you talk softly but carry a big stick. At the same time, however, Iran knows how costly it would be for the Americans (and perhaps the Israelis) to use force, which reduces the effect of the threat.

At present, a diplomatic solution does not look promising. Iran has threatened to leave the NPT if sanctions are imposed, and Russia and China worry that even modest targeted sanctions could escalate and ultimately legitimise an American use of force that they wish to avoid. China wants to preserve its access to Iranian oil, and Russia seeks to preserve a valuable commercial market. But both realise that a failure to resolve the issue in the context of the UN (in which they are major stakeholders as permanent members of the Security Council) could severely damage the future of that institution.

Today, the diplomatic package consists mostly of penalties, albeit the small ones of targeted sanctions. Their main effect will be psychological if widespread support for them creates a sense in Iran that it has isolated itself. Unlike North Korea, Iran is more likely to care about its international standing.

The diplomatic package could be made more attractive if the US would add more positive incentives. Through a credible intermediary, the US could offer to consider security guarantees and relief from existing sanctions if Iran agrees to forego domestic enrichment and accept the Russian offer, perhaps garbed as an

IAEA-backed international consortium in which Iran could participate. This would mean abandoning the temptations of coercive regime change that hamstrung American diplomacy in Bush?s first term.

By increasing economic and cultural ties, diplomacy might unleash the soft power that could contribute to more gradual regime transformation over the longer term.

Meanwhile, such an approach might avoid the costly use of force and buy time for a more benign outcome than what lies at the end of the current path of events.

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2006.

Donald Rumsfeld and smart power

Joseph S Nye is Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard?s Kennedy School of Government and author, most recently, ofThe Power Game: A Washington Novel. His last essay on Webdiary was . by Joseph S Nye

Donald Rumsfeld, America?s Secretary of Defense, recently spoke about the Bush administration?s global war on terror. “In this war, some of the most critical battles may not be in the mountains of Afghanistan or the streets of Iraq, but in newsrooms in New York, London, Cairo, and elsewhere. Our enemies have skillfully adapted to fighting wars in the media age, but for the most part we have not.”

The good news is that Rumsfeld is beginning to realise that the struggle against terrorism cannot be won by hard military power alone. The bad news is that he still does not understand soft power – the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion. As The Economist commented about Rumsfeld?s speech, “until recently he plainly regarded such a focus on ?soft power? as, well, soft – part of ?Old Europe?s? appeasement of terrorism.”

Now Rumsfeld finally realises the importance of winning hearts and minds, but, as The Economist put it, “a good part of his speech was focused on how with slicker PR America could win the propaganda war.” In other words, in blaming the media for America?s problems, Rumsfeld forgot the first rule of marketing: if you have a poor

product, not even the best advertising will sell it.

Rumsfeld?s mistrust of the European approach contains a grain of truth. Europe has used the attractiveness of its Union to obtain outcomes it wants, just as the US has acted as though its military pre-eminence could solve all problems. But it is a mistake to count too much on hard or soft power alone. The ability to combine them effectively is “smart power.”

During the Cold War, the West used hard power to deter Soviet aggression, while it used soft power to erode faith in Communism behind the iron curtain. That was smart power. To be smart today, Europe should invest more in its hard-power resources, and America should pay more attention to its soft power.

During President George W Bush?s first term, Secretary of State Colin Powell

understood and referred to soft power, whereas Rumsfeld, when asked about soft power in 2003, replied “I don?t know what it means.” A high price was paid for that ignorance. Fortunately, in his second term, with Condoleezza Rice and Karen Hughes at the State Department and Rumsfeld?s reputation dented by failures that in the private sector would have led to his firing or resignation, Bush has shown an increased concern about America?s soft power.

Of course, soft power is no panacea. For example, soft power got nowhere in

attracting the Taliban government away from its support for Al Qaeda in the 1990?s. It took hard military power to sever that tie. Similarly, North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il likes to watch Hollywood movies, but that is unlikely to affect his decision about whether to give up his nuclear weapons program. Such a choice will be

determined by hard power, particularly if China agrees to economic sanctions. Nor will soft power be sufficient to stop Iran?s nuclear program, though the legitimacy of the Bush administration?s current multilateral approach may help to recruit other countries to a coalition that isolates Iran.

But other goals, such as promoting democracy and human rights, are better achieved by soft power. Coercive democratisation has its limits, as the US has learned in Iraq. This does not mean that Rumsfeld?s Pentagon is irrelevant to American soft power. Military force is sometimes treated as synonymous with hard power, but the same resource can sometimes contribute to soft power. A well-run military can be a source of attraction, and military cooperation and training programs can establish transnational networks that enhance a country?s soft power. The US military?s

impressive work in providing humanitarian relief after the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 helped restore America?s attractiveness, and enhanced its soft power.

But the misuse of military resources can also undercut soft power. The Soviet Union possessed a great deal of soft power in the years after World War II. But the

Soviets? attractiveness as liberators was destroyed by the way they later used their hard power against Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

Brutality and indifference to “just war” principles of discrimination and

proportionality can also destroy legitimacy. The efficiency of the initial American military invasion of Iraq in 2003 created admiration in the eyes of some foreigners. But this soft power was undercut by the inefficiency of the occupation, the

mistreatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib, and the policy – initiated by Rumsfeld – of

detainment without hearings at Guantánamo.

To be sure, no on expects that we can ever attract people like Mohammed Atta or Osama bin Laden. We need hard power to deal with such cases. But today?s terrorist threat is not Samuel Huntington?s clash of civilisations. It is a civil war within Islam between a majority of normal people and a small minority who want to coerce others into a accepting a highly ideological and politicised version of their religion. We

cannot win unless the moderates win. We cannot win unless the number of people the extremists recruit is lower than the number we kill and deter.

Rumsfeld may understand this calculus in principle, but his words and actions show that he does not know how to balance the equation in practice. Doing so – and thus being in a position to win the war – is impossible without soft power.

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2006.

Mikhail Gorbachev and the end of the Cold War

Joseph S Nye is Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard?s Kennedy School of Government and author, most recently, ofThe Power Game: A Washington Novel. by Joseph S Nye

Earlier this month, Mikhail Gorbachev celebrated his 75th birthday with a concert and conference at his foundation in Moscow. Unfortunately, he is not popular with the Russian people, who blame him for the loss of Soviet power. But, as Gorbachev has replied to those who shout abuse at him, “Remember, I am the one who gave you the right to shout.”

When he came to power in 1985, Gorbachev tried to discipline the Soviet people as a way to overcome economic stagnation. When discipline failed to solve the problem, he launched perestroika (“restructuring”). And when bureaucrats continually thwarted his orders, he used glasnost, or open discussion and democratisation. But once glasnost let people say what they thought, many people said, “We want out.” By December 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist.

Gorbachev?s foreign policy, which he called “new thinking,” also contributed to the Cold War?s end. Gorbachev said that security was a game from which all could benefit through cooperation. Rather than try to build as many nuclear weapons as possible, he proclaimed a doctrine of “sufficiency,” holding only a minimal number for protection. He also believed that Soviet control over an empire in Eastern Europe was costing too much and providing too little benefit, and that the invasion of Afghanistan had been a costly disaster.

By the summer of 1989, East Europeans were given more degrees of freedom. Gorbachev refused to sanction the use of force to put down demonstrations. By November, the Berlin Wall had fallen.

Some of these events stemmed from Gorbachev?s miscalculations. After all, he wanted to reform communism, not replace it. But his reforms snowballed into a

revolution driven from below rather than controlled from above. In trying to repair communism, he punched a hole in it. Like a hole in a dam, once pent-up pressure began to escape, it widened the opening and tore apart the system.

By contrast, if the Communist Party?s Politburo had chosen one of Gorbachev?s hard-line competitors in 1985, it is plausible that the declining Soviet Union could have held on for another decade or so. It did not have to collapse so quickly. Gorbachev?s humanitarian tinkering contributed greatly to the timing.

But there were also deeper causes for the Soviet demise. One was the “soft” power of liberal ideas, whose spread was aided by the growth of transnational

communications and contacts, while the demonstration effect of Western economic success gave them additional appeal. In addition, the huge Soviet defense budget began to undermine other aspects of Soviet society. Health care deteriorated and the mortality rate increased (the only developed country where that occurred). Eventually, even the military became aware of the tremendous burden caused by imperial overstretch.

Ultimately, the deepest causes of the Soviet collapse were the decline of communist ideology and economic failure. This would have happened even without Gorbachev. In the early Cold War, communism and the Soviet Union had considerable soft power. Many communists led the resistance against fascism in Europe, and many people believed that communism was the wave of the future.

But Soviet soft power was undercut by the exposure of Stalin?s crimes in 1956, and by the repression in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland in 1981. Although in theory communism aimed to establish a system of class justice, Lenin?s heirs maintained domestic power through a brutal security apparatus involving lethal purges, gulags, broad censorship, and ubiquitous informants. The net effect of these brutal measures was a general loss of faith in the system.

The Soviet economy?s decline, meanwhile, reflected the diminished ability of central planning to respond to global economic change. Stalin had created a command economy that emphasized heavy manufacturing and smokestack industries, making it highly inflexible – all thumbs and no fingers.

As the economist Joseph Schumpeter pointed out, capitalism is “creative

destruction,” a way of responding flexibly to major waves of technological change. At the end of the twentieth century, the major technological change of the third

industrial revolution was the growing role of information as the scarcest resource in an economy. The Soviet system was particularly inept at handling information. The deep secrecy of its political system meant that the flow of information was slow and cumbersome.

Economic globalisation created turmoil throughout the world at the end of the

twentieth century, but the Western market economies were able to re-allocate labor to services, restructure their heavy industries, and switch to computers. The Soviet Union could not keep up.

Indeed, when Gorbachev came to power in 1985, there were 50,000 personal

computers in the Soviet Union; in the US, there were 30 million. Four years later, there were about 400,000 personal computers in the Soviet Union, and 40 million in the US. According to one Soviet economist, by the late 1980?s, only 8% of Soviet industry was globally competitive. It is difficult for a country to remain a superpower when the world doesn?t want 92% of what it produces.

The lessons for today are clear. While military power remains important, it is a

mistake for any country to discount the role of economic power and soft power. But it is also a mistake to discount the importance of leaders with humanitarian values. The Soviet Union may have been doomed, but the world has Gorbachev to thank for the fact that the empire he oversaw ended without a bloody conflagration.

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2006.

Taming North Korea

Joseph S Nye is Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard?s Kennedy School of Government and author, most recently, ofThe Power Game: A Washington Novel. His previous post on Webdiary was .

by Joseph S Nye

The fires of the Middle East must not be allowed to distract the world?s attention from the threat posed by North Korea?s nuclear ambitions, which it demonstrated by its recent test of a long-range missile. Yet that is what appears to be happening. In mid-July, the Group of Eight?s summit in St. Petersburg ended by calling on North Korea to stop its missile tests and to abandon its nuclear weapons program. This followed a UN Security Council resolution that condemned North Korea?s missile

launches of July 5, demanded that it return to the negotiating table, and required UN members to prevent the import and export of any material or money related to North Korea?s missile or unconventional weapons programs. China?s President Hu Jintao urged progress in the stalled talks so that "the entire Korean peninsula can be denuclearized." This seemed like a diplomatic breakthrough, but there was less forward movement than meets the eye.

During its first term, the Bush administration hoped that it could solve the North Korean nuclear problem through regime change. The hope was that isolation and sanctions would topple Kim Jong Il?s dictatorship. But the regime proved resistant, and the Bush administration agreed to enter into six-party talks with China, Russia, Japan, and the two Koreas.

In September 2005, it appeared momentarily that the talks had produced a rough agreement that North Korea would forgo its nuclear program in return for security guarantees and removal of sanctions. But the loosely worded accord soon collapsed,

and North Korea refused to return to the talks until the US stopped shutting down bank accounts suspected of counterfeiting and laundering money for Kim?s regime. Diplomacy remained stalled until North Korea launched a series of missiles into the Sea of Japan in July. Japan called for UN Security Council sanctions, and after ten days of wrangling, all five permanent members agreed on a resolution condemning North Korea?s actions.

Why did North Korea risk taking actions that defied China, its main benefactor, and brought about the UN resolution? In part, it acted because it saw the great powers offering Iran an interesting package of incentives to give up its nuclear enrichment program, while North Korea was being relegated to a diplomatic side track. But it also acted because taking such risks has proven successful in the past, and here, Kim probably believed the risks were low.

Kim knows that the five other countries in the six-party talks are divided. While all five want a non-nuclear North Korea, China and South Korea place a higher priority on the stability of the North Korean regime than the US and Japan do.

South Korean public opinion is split on how to handle the North, but the majority fear that a sudden collapse would have catastrophic effects on the South?s economy. Many in the younger generation have no direct memories of the Korean War. Thus, South Korea?s "sunshine policy" of economic engagement with the North commands majority approval.

Similarly, China, with its focus on economic growth, fears that a collapse of the North Korean regime would threaten stability on its borders. Thus, while China has

occasionally pressed North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program, it has been unwilling to exercise its economic leverage to a point that threatens the regime. Because its preferred approach of regime change has proven slower than expected, and because time plays into Kim?s hands, the Bush administration faces three other options in attempting to deal with North Korea?s nuclear weapons. It could use force, and some officials have argued that if North Korea launched a war in response to a limited American air strike, Kim would lose his regime. Thus, war would be unlikely. But is unlikely that an air strike would destroy North Korea?s hidden facilities, which include more than 10,000 artillery tubes buried in caves along the demilitarized zone, North Korea could simply shell Seoul in response and wreak havoc on the South

Korean economy. Thus, South Korea, together with China, would likely react strongly against an American air strike.

A second option is sanctions. Some in the Bush administration believe that even if economic sanctions would not end the regime, they might cause enough pain to cause Kim to give up its weapons. They point to the success of efforts to shut down illegal banking transactions and to the Proliferation Security Initiative, in which other countries agree to interdict transport of nuclear materials.

But success depends upon China, and South Korea and China failed to participate in recent PSI exercises. Moreover, in the wrangling over the UN resolution, China

threatened a veto if there were any references to Chapter VII of the Charter, which allows enforcement. Knowing that China will not allow sanctions to cut too deeply, Kim is unlikely to give up his nuclear ace.

That leaves the third option, a diplomatic bargain, for which Kim?s price is direct talks with the US, a security guarantee, and the type of economic incentives that were offered to Iran. Bush has allowed his representative to the six-party talks to meet separately with the North Koreans within the six-party framework, but he failed to provide adequate incentives.

Given North Korea?s past deceptions, and the difficulty of verifying denuclearization in a totalitarian country, a verifiable agreement will be difficult to reach. But given the other options, the US would be wise to start thinking of a new diplomatic package. Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2006.

Russia's Fragile Power is Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard?s Kennedy School of Government and author, most recently, ofUnderstanding International Conflicts. His previous post on Webdiary was

by Joseph S. Nye

Russia sent an impressive delegation to the World Economic Forum at Davos this year. After strong representation under Boris Yeltsin, the level of Russia?s participants had slipped since Vladimir Putin became president. This year, however, the Russians sent their “A” team, and a well-attended session focused on “Russia?s More Muscular Foreign Policy.”

With higher energy prices, many Russian officials are enjoying their renewed power. I was asked to comment on United States-Russian relations at a dinner with top officials from the government and Gazprom, the giant energy company. I said that America and Europe had too many illusions about democracy in Russia in the 1990?s, and were now going through a stage of disillusionment. There is concern about

Russia?s future, how it will use its newfound power, and how the West should respond.

One view is that Russian politics is like a pendulum. It had swung too far in the

direction of chaos under Yeltsin, and has now swung too far in the direction of order and state control under Putin. It has not swung back to Stalinism; Czarism might be a better historical metaphor. Observers debate whether it will eventually reach a new equilibrium.

The optimistic view is that property rights are becoming more deeply anchored than they were in the past, and that Russia?s future will depend on how fast a middle class with a stake in law-based government can be created. But others are not so sure. Sometimes pendulums continue to oscillate wildly unless there is some friction to slow

them down, and sometimes they get stuck. Pessimistic observers foresee a continual decline of freedom rather than a liberal equilibrium.

Faced with this uncertainty about the future of liberal democracy in Russia, how should western countries respond? This question is particularly difficult for the Bush administration, which is torn between the president?s early endorsement of Putin and his pro-democracy agenda.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice declared in 2005 that “the fundamental character of regimes matters more today than the international distribution of power,” and Senator John McCain, a US presidential candidate, has urged removing Russia from the Group of Eight advanced countries. Yet, in addition to its democracy agenda, the West has a realist agenda based on very tangible interests.

The West needs Russian cooperation in dealing with issues like nuclear proliferation in Iran and North Korea, the control of nuclear materials and weapons, combating the current wave of radical Islamist terrorism, and energy production and security.

Moreover, Russia possesses talented people, technology, and resources that can help to meet new challenges like climate change or the spread of pandemic diseases.

There may not be as much conflict between these two agendas as first appears. If the West were to turn its back on Russia, such isolation would reinforce the

xenophobic and statist tendencies present in Russian political culture and make the liberal cause more difficult.

A better approach would be to look to the long run, use the soft power of attraction, expand exchanges and contacts with Russia?s new generation, support its participation in the World Trade Organization and other market-oriented institutions, and address deficiencies with specific criticisms rather than general harangues or isolation. In any case, the sources of political change in Russia will remain largely rooted in Russia, and Western influence will inevitably be limited.

But advocating engagement over isolation should not prevent friendly criticism, and in Davos I offered four reasons why Russia will not remain a major power in 2020 unless it changes its current behavior and policies.

First, Russia is failing to diversify its economy rapidly enough. Oil is a mixed blessing. Riding on record-high energy prices and raw material exports, in January 2007 Russia became the world?s tenth-largest economy. But energy exports finance about 30% of a government budget that is based on forecasts that oil remains at $61 per barrel. Russian industrial exports primarily consist of armaments, with advanced aircraft accounting for more than half of sales. That leaves Russia vulnerable.

A related problem is that Russia lacks a rule of law that protects and encourages

entrepreneurs. These are precisely the people needed to help foster a vibrant middle class – the bedrock of a stable democratic market economy. Instead, corruption is rampant.

Moreover, Russia?s demographic crisis continues, sustained by poor public health and inadequate investment in a social safety net. Most demographers expect Russia?s population to shrink significantly over the coming decades. Adult male mortality is much higher than in the rest of Europe, and it has not been improving.

Finally, while one can understand a former superpower?s temptation to seize its

opportunity to return to a muscular foreign policy, Russia?s bullying in the energy area is destroying trust and undercutting Russia?s soft power in other countries. Both Russia?s neighbors and Western Europe have become more wary of depending upon Russia.

Most Russian participants at the Davos dinner seemed to ignore these criticisms, but it was interesting to hear one important official admit that reform might progress faster if oil prices dropped somewhat, and another accept the point that criticism should be welcomed as long as it is offered in a friendly spirit. The mere fact that high-level Russians reappeared in Davos to defend themselves may be a small but healthy sign.

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2007.