读《论法的精神》有感

简析孟德斯鸠的部分经济和宗教思想

学院：政法学院

班级：10级行管（1）班

学号：12010245962

姓名：王丽美

作者简介：

孟德斯鸠（1689-1755），法国著名的启蒙思想家、社会学家、法学家，是与伏尔泰（1694-1778）、卢梭（1712-1778）齐名的法国资产阶级革命的思想先驱之一。孟德斯鸠出生在色贡达家族，这是一个贵族世家，历代服务于纳瓦尔朝廷。1716年孟德斯鸠继承了其伯父波尔多议会会长的职务，并依遗嘱承袭了伯父“孟德斯鸠男爵”的尊号，这个称号也就同时标记着他的贵族世家的身份。他既好学，又有雄厚的经济力量和充裕的时间去周游列国，阅读资料，吸收经验和知识，从事著述，终于完成了《论法的精神》这部重要的著作。 内容概要：

《论法的精神》这本书，分为上、下两册，共三十一章内容，包含基本理论、政治理论、法律理论和经济理论四个部分。在这 本书里，孟德斯鸠企图以丰富的历史事实为依据，建立起国家与法的一般性的规律与原则，寻找出历史演进的规律。与此同时，他从历史、

生活、风俗习惯种种方面去研究法律的“精神“，还从社会的演进去探求这种力量在政治、法律方面所起的作用和一般的规律。孟德斯鸠的思想被资产阶级用作反封建、反暴政的武器，孟德斯鸠关于分权和法制的理论被一些资产阶级国家所采用。孟德斯鸠最大的影响在于他的思想成为资产阶级世界的基本社会理论——“宪政论”的主要组成部分，也对中国民国时代的宪法和法制产生了极其深远的影响。 正文

前言

作为法国新兴资产阶级的代表，孟德斯鸠对经济问题是非常重视的。在他的著作中，它不仅对法国经济制度上的弊端进行了揭露和抨击，而且针对当时已经陷于崩溃边缘、民穷财尽的法国经济状况，提出了改革经济的主理论。他认为，“爱俭朴”是实行民主政治的共和国的国民应当具有的美德。共和国的国民是以俭朴为乐的。因为，在共和国里，“每一个人既然都应该有同样的幸福和同样的利益，那么也应该享受同样的快乐，抱有同样的希望。”孟德斯鸠的经济思想，尤其是关于贸易问题的思想，是18世纪法国资本主义经济日益发展的产物，它反映了18世纪上半叶法国新兴资产阶级力图摆脱封建桎槁，发展资本主义工商业的迫切要求。它也是孟德斯鸠反对封建专制主义思想的一个重要组成部分，其中所包含的许多合理因素，对我们今天仍具有很重要的现实意义。宗教信仰是伴随着人类社会的发展而出现的，并逐渐成为人类生活的一个重要组成部分。孟德斯鸠认为，要把宗教利益与国家政治体制的利益结合起来，宗教同法律的作用是

一样的，是让人们安居乐业的可靠保证。

一、先富民，后富国的经济思想

在经济学说史上，孟德斯鸠是“货币数量论”的代表人物之一。孟德斯鸠认为，劳动是财富的源泉。他坚决批判了所谓“要人民勤劳，就必须征重税”的谬论。他指出：“说重税本身是好的这种推理法是笨拙的。”他还认为，对公民征收较少的赋税，先富民，后富国，从而达到民富国强。他这样的经济观点，让我联想到了中国的现实问题——免除农业税。中国是一个农业大国，农民的人口占到了总人口的绝大多数，为了减轻农民的经济负担，提高农民的生活质量；为了拉动经济的增长，实现经济又好又快发展；为了提高综合国力，实现中华民族的伟大复兴。国家决定免除农业税，实现农业的现代化发展。这样的政策，可以说的上是利国利民。我们可以清晰的看到，自从这一政策实行以来，农民的生产积极性提高了，粮食的产量也增加了，中国的经济实力正在朝着稳健良好的方向发展。

从中国的现实问题出发，反映了孟德斯鸠思想的合理性和可行性。所以，他表达的先富民，后富国的思想是很重要的，非常值得重视，也是值得各个国家借鉴和思考的。

二、勤劳俭朴的经济思想

孟德斯鸠作为新兴资产阶级的思想家，它是提倡勤劳、俭朴，反对好逸恶劳、奢侈浪费的。面对这样的经济思想，不得不让我为今天的消费现状和生活理念感到叹息。如今，中国继承了日本“世界头号奢侈品消费大国”的称号，居世界奢侈品消费排行之首。伴随着中国

加入世界贸易组织，经济全球化体系的形成和科学发展观政策的贯彻，我们国家的经济发展水平不断提高，综合国力不断增强。所以，人们的消费理念不断更新，消费方式不断变换，消费水平不断提高。

可是，在我看来，无论什么时候勤劳俭朴，艰苦奋斗都是不过时的。任何事物的自身都存在着两面性，带来益处的同时，坏处也会浮现出来。当然，奢侈逸乐的消费观念在促进社会经济发展的同时，也形成了不良的社会风气，不利于精神文明建设和思想道德体系的形成。勤劳俭朴，艰苦奋斗是我们中华民族精神的表现，中国历来以这样的美好精神而闻名世界，我们应该继续保持和发扬它。奢侈的消费观念，能够促进商品的大量生产，能够为商家带来丰厚的利润，同时也能够增加国家的税额。但是，我们的物质欲望和需求满足了，精神需要却变质了。当今这个社会，应该倡导的是物质需求和精神文明同步发展，不能舍弃一方或者偏向一方发展。

这样看来，孟德斯鸠这样节俭的经济思想是符合当今社会现状的，我们应该重视这样的经济思想，养成勤劳俭朴的习惯，形成良好的消费和生活理念，弘扬我们中华民族的优良精神，屹立于世界民族之林。

三、关于贸易问题的经济思想

孟德斯鸠以其敏锐的目光清醒的看到，贸易对于风俗的影响是多方面的，既有积极的影响，又有消极的影响。它既可以使野蛮的风俗日趋典雅与温厚，又可以破坏纯良的风俗，使之日趋腐败。他看到了资本主义商业的发展，把人与人的一切关系，都变成了赤裸裸的金钱

关系这个冷酷的现实。我们不能否认贸易给社会经济带来的巨大经济利益，但是这让我不禁联想到了在这个经济贸易快速发展的社会上，多少高官因为金钱丧失职位，丢弃名誉，最终落马。是他们抵挡诱惑的能力不够高，还是国家体制不够健全。

腐败已不再是一个新鲜的社会话题，这样的问题和现象已存在了几千年并延续至今。重庆的公安局长文强，铁道部部长刘志军等，这一个又一个的贪污腐败事实，让我们震撼不已。与此同时，我还想到了拿钱买官的社会现实，只要有钱，能够当上公务员，能够拿着国家的俸禄却无所做为。原来，在贸易经济快速发展的背后却隐藏着如此巨大的社会腐败问题。

我认为，为了治理和减少类似的问题，应该建立健全完善的经济制度；增强对经济的管理力度；加大对贪污腐败的打击力度；健全公务员的考核制度；强化公众监督和媒体监督。

四、宗教信仰自由的思想

孟德斯鸠坚决主张宗教信仰自由，反对采取强制手段要人们信教，猛烈抨击宗教裁判所的残暴行为。每一个国家都存在着不同派别的宗教组织。比如，在中国就有伊斯兰教，佛教和基督教等。中国的人口现状是人口多，基数大，同时，又是由五十六个民族组成的。这样多的人口和民族，如果要求他们信仰一种教派，那会出现何种局面？这个问题的结果难以想象，我们只能坚持宗教信仰自由，传承和发扬宗教文化，促进不同教派之间的交流;坚持宗教信仰自由，维护社会秩序稳定;坚持宗教信仰自由，促进各民族之间共同繁荣发展。

我们国家的人口问题和民族问题非常符合孟德斯鸠的这一宗教思想，我们应该对此引起高度重视，并继续坚持和贯彻这一思想。

结语

在十八世纪法国启蒙时期，进步的资产阶级是首先以思想斗争的形式向腐朽的封建主义进攻的。这时期的进步思想是推动其后的政治、革命斗争的重要动力。孟德斯鸠是这个时期杰出的先进思想家之一，他的著作是人类进步传统的一个重要的组成部分，是人类文化的宝贵遗产。就《论法的精神》而言，上、下两册，四个部分，三十一章内容，向我们诠释了他的热情、智慧、渊博的知识和犀利的文笔，更向我们集中展现了他的思想结晶。通过以上我对孟德斯鸠的部分经济和宗教思想的介绍，我们应该能够感受到孟德斯鸠的思想对今天社会发展和人类生活的贡献和作用，同时也能看到那些思想带来的现实意义。孟德斯鸠的思想牵涉的范围很广，我们不能够一一加以论述和解释，只能抓住符合今天历史发展的某些思想，在了解和学习的同时，继续坚持、借鉴和创新。

站在前人的肩膀上，我们可以看得更远，做得更好，唱的更响。感谢上天赐予我们伟大的孟德斯鸠，带给我们后世如此震撼的思想理论，使得今天的社会能够稳健的发展。

第二篇：TOLES阅读：论法的精神

The Spirit of Laws

By Charles de Montesquieu

Of Laws in General

1. Of the Relation of Laws to different Beings. Laws, in their most general signification, are the necessary relations arising from the nature of things. In this sense all beings have their laws: the Deity1 His laws, the material world its laws, the intelligences superior to man their laws, the beasts their laws, man his laws.

They who assert that a blind fatality produced the various effects we behold in this world talk very absurdly; for can anything be more unreasonable than to pretend that a blind fatality could be productive of intelligent beings?

There is, then, a prime reason; and laws are the relations subsisting between it and different beings, and the relations of these to one another.

God is related to the universe, as Creator and Preserver; the laws by which He created all things are those by which He preserves them. He acts according to these rules, because He knows them; He knows them, because He made them; and He made them, because they are in relation to His wisdom and power.

Since we observe that the world, though formed by the motion of matter, and void of understanding, subsists through so long a succession of ages, its motions must certainly be directed by invariable laws; and could we imagine another world, it must also have constant rules, or it would inevitably perish.

Thus the creation, which seems an arbitrary act, supposes laws as invariable as those of the fatality of the Atheists. It would be absurd to say that the Creator might govern the world without those rules, since without them it could not subsist.

These rules are a fixed and invariable relation. In bodies moved, the motion is received, increased, diminished, or lost, according to the relations of the quantity of matter and velocity; each diversity is uniformity, each change is constancy.

Particular intelligent beings may have laws of their own making, but they have some likewise which they never made. Before there were intelligent beings, they were possible; they had therefore possible relations, and consequently possible laws. Before laws were made, there were relations of possible justice. To say that there is nothing just or unjust but what is commanded or forbidden by positive laws, is the same as saying that before the describing of a circle all the radii were not equal.

We must therefore acknowledge relations of justice antecedent to the positive law by which they are established: as, for instance, if human societies existed, it would be right to conform to their laws; if there were intelligent beings that had received a benefit of another being, they ought to show their gratitude; if one intelligent being had created another intelligent being, the latter ought to continue in its original state of dependence; if one intelligent being injures another, it deserves a retaliation; and so on.

But the intelligent world is far from being so well governed as the physical. For though the former has also its laws, which of their own nature are invariable, it does not conform to them so exactly as the physical world. This is because, on the one hand, particular intelligent beings are of a finite nature, and consequently liable to error; and on the other, their nature requires them to be free agents. Hence they do not steadily conform to their primitive laws; and even those of their own instituting they frequently infringe.

Whether brutes be governed by the general laws of motion, or by a particular movement, we cannot determine. Be that as it may, they have not a more intimate relation to God than the rest of the material world; and sensation is of no other use to them than in the relation they have either to other particular beings or to themselves.

By the allurement of pleasure they preserve the individual, and by the same allurement they preserve their species. They have natural laws, because they are united by sensation; positive laws they have none, because they are not connected by knowledge. And yet they do not invariably conform to their natural laws; these are better observed by vegetables, that have neither understanding nor sense.

Brutes are deprived of the high advantages which we have; but they have some which we have not. They have not our hopes, but they are without our fears; they are subject like us to death, but without knowing it; even most of them are more attentive than we to self-preservation, and do not make so bad a use of their passions.

Man, as a physical being, is like other bodies governed by invariable laws. As an intelligent being, he incessantly transgresses the laws established by God, and changes those of his own instituting. He is left to his private direction, though a limited being, and subject, like all finite intelligences, to ignorance and error: even his imperfect knowledge he loses; and as a sensible creature, he is hurried away by a thousand impetuous passions. Such a being might every instant forget his Creator; God has therefore reminded him of his duty by the laws of religion. Such a being is liable every moment to forget himself; philosophy has provided against this by the laws of morality. Formed to live in society, he might forget his fellow-creatures; legislators have therefore by political and civil laws confined him to his duty.

2. Of the Laws of Nature. Antecedent to the above-mentioned laws are those of nature, so called, because they derive their force entirely from our frame and existence. In order to have a perfect knowledge of these laws, we must consider man before the establishment of society: the laws received in such a state would be those of nature.

The law which, impressing on our minds the idea of a Creator, inclines us towards Him, is the first in importance, though not in order, of natural laws. Man in a state of nature would have the faculty of knowing, before he had acquired any

knowledge. Plain it is that his first ideas would not be of a speculative nature; he would think of the preservation of his being, before he would investigate its origin. Such a man would feel nothing in himself at first but impotency and weakness; his fears and apprehensions would be excessive; as appears from instances (were there any necessity of proving it) of savages found in forests,2 trembling at the motion of a leaf, and flying from every shadow.

In this state every man, instead of being sensible of his equality, would fancy himself inferior. There would therefore be no danger of their attacking one another; peace would be the first law of nature.

The natural impulse or desire which Hobbes attributes to mankind of subduing one another is far from being well founded. The idea of empire and dominion is so complex, and depends on so many other notions, that it could never be the first which occurred to the human understanding.

Hobbes3 inquires, "For what reason go men armed, and have locks and keys to fasten their doors, if they be not naturally in a state of war?" But is it not obvious that he attributes to mankind before the establishment of society what can happen but in consequence of this establishment, which furnishes them with motives for hostile attacks and self-defence?

Next to a sense of his weakness man would soon find that of his wants. Hence another law of nature would prompt him to seek for nourishment.

Fear, I have observed, would induce men to shun one another; but the marks of this fear being reciprocal, would soon engage them to associate. Besides, this association would quickly follow from. the very pleasure one animal feels at the approach of another of the same species. Again, the attraction arising from the difference of sexes would enhance this pleasure, and the natural inclination they have for each other would form a third law.

Beside the sense or instinct which man possesses in common with brutes, he has the advantage of acquired knowledge; and thence arises a second tie, which brutes have not. Mankind have therefore a new motive of uniting; and a fourth law of nature results from the desire of living in society.

3. Of Positive Laws. As soon as man enters into a state of society he loses the sense of his weakness; equality ceases, and then commences the state of war.

Each particular society begins to feel its strength, whence arises a state of war between different nations. The individuals likewise of each society become sensible of their force; hence the principal advantages of this society they endeavour to convert to their own emolument, which constitutes a state of war between individuals.

These two different kinds of states give rise to human laws. Considered as inhabitants of so great a planet, which necessarily contains a variety of nations, they have laws relating to their mutual intercourse, which is what we call the law of nations. As members of a society that must be properly supported, they have laws relating to the governors and the governed, and this we distinguish by the name of politic law. They have also another sort of law, as they stand in relation to each other; by which is understood the civil law.

The law of nations is naturally founded on this principle, that different nations ought in time of peace to do one another all the good they can, and in time of war as little injury as possible, without prejudicing their real interests.

The object of war is victory; that of victory is conquest; and that of conquest preservation. From this and the preceding principle all those rules are derived which constitute the law of nations.

All countries have a law of nations, not excepting the Iroquois themselves, though they devour their prisoners: for they send and receive ambassadors, and understand the rights of war and peace. The mischief is that their law of nations is not

founded on true principles.

Besides the law of nations relating to all societies, there is a polity or civil constitution for each particularly considered. No society can subsist without a form of government. "The united strength of individuals," as Gravina4 well observes, "constitutes what we call the body politic."

The general strength may be in the hands of a single person, or of many. Some think that nature having established paternal authority, the most natural government was that of a single person. But the example of paternal authority proves nothing. For if the power of a father relates to a single government, that of brothers after the death of a father, and that of cousins-german after the decease of brothers, refer to a government of many. The political power necessarily comprehends the union of several families.

Better is it to say, that the government most conformable to nature is that which best agrees with the humour and disposition of the people in whose favour it is established.

The strength of individuals cannot be united without a conjunction of all their wills. "The conjunction of those wills," as Gravina again very justly observes, "is what we call the civil state."

Law in general is human reason, inasmuch as it governs all the inhabitants of the earth: the political and civil laws of each nation ought to be only the particular cases in which human reason is applied.

They should be adapted in such a manner to the people for whom they are framed that it should be a great chance if those of one nation suit another.

They should be in relation to the nature and principle of each government; whether they form it, as may be said of politic laws; or whether they support it, as in

the case of civil institutions.

They should be in relation to the climate of each country, to the quality of its soil, to its situation and extent, to the principal occupation of the natives, whether husbandmen, huntsmen, or shepherds: they should have relation to the degree of liberty which the constitution will bear; to the religion of the inhabitants, to their inclinations, riches, numbers, commerce, manners, and customs. In fine, they have relations to each other, as also to their origin, to the intent of the legislator, and to the order of things on which they are established; in all of which different lights they ought to be considered.

This is what I have undertaken to perform in the following work. These relations I shall examine, since all these together constitute what I call the Spirit of Laws.

I have not separated the political from the civil institutions, as I do not pretend to treat of laws, but of their spirit; and as this spirit consists in the various relations which the laws may bear to different objects, it is not so much my business to follow the natural order of laws as that of these relations and objects.

I shall first examine the relations which laws bear to the nature and principle of each government; and as this principle has a strong influence on laws, I shall make it my study to understand it thoroughly: and if I can but once establish it, the laws will soon appear to flow thence as from their source. I shall proceed afterwards to other and more particular relations.

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1. "Law," says Plutarch, "is the king of mortal and immortal beings." See his treatise, A Discourse to an Unlearned Prince.

2. Witness the savage found in the forests of Hanover, who was carried over to

England during the reign of George I.

3. In pref., De cive.

4. Italian poet and jurist, 1664-1718.

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