中班案例：《三只小猪》

案例背景：

罕罕是我班一名性格活泼好动的男孩，口语表达能力很好，有一定想象力，与同伴交流时，能用普通话表达清楚自己的意思;对阅读图书有一定的兴趣，但在阅读图书时缺乏耐心，经常这本看到那本，不能专心看一本书。

案例描述：

今天是周末，爸爸带着罕罕去儿童阅读室看书，刚进去的时候罕罕看到那么多书可高兴了，他这个也想看那个也想看，只见他一会拿了这本书看了一会，过了一会又拿了另外一本书看了一会又还回去了。爸爸看见罕罕这么不专心，于是走对去对罕罕说：“你专心一点，选一本坐下来慢慢看。”爸爸给了罕罕一本书开始和罕罕一起看，罕罕看了一眼，摇摇头说：“上面的字那么多，我都看不懂。”爸爸只好陪着罕罕再选一本书，这次罕罕选了一本画面比较鲜艳而且角色又比较鲜明的《三只小猪》。他拉着爸爸高兴地坐了下来，一边看一边说：“我们小朋友说这个书可好看了，爸爸你看，第三只小猪可聪明啦。”说完便和爸爸一起开心地看起书来。

案例分析：

通过这次的案例我发现好的绘本题材不仅能提起幼儿的阅读兴趣还可以帮助幼儿尽早进入知识的海洋，开阔幼儿的视野，启迪幼儿的智慧，陶冶幼儿的性情，丰富幼儿的知识，促进幼儿的成长。家长要好好把握幼儿的年龄特点，放低自己的视点，站在孩子的立场解读教材、精心选材，以孩子的眼光理解内容，使孩子充分成为活动的主体，和他们一起进入阅读的世界，什么样的早期阅读教材适合中班幼儿阅读。

1、绘本画面简单、角色鲜明

《三只小猪》的绘本故事画面简介，基本没有复杂的背景图案，里面的小动物角色形象比较清楚，让幼儿很快地找到绘本里的角色人物。另外画面的色彩明亮，整体的绘本颜色让人感觉舒服、大方，也更能吸引幼儿的兴趣，便于幼儿观

察和理解图片的内容。。

2、内容贴近生活、富有挑战

这三只小猪究竟会不会被大灰狼吃掉呢？这么一个问题总是牵着幼儿好奇的思绪，探索的过程同样充满期待和奥妙，三只小猪的性格不同，因此他们造的房子也不同，孩子们在阅读绘本的过程中认识了砖房，木头房子以及草房，比较了他们之间的坚固性，获得了很多认知方面的体验。

4、寓意启蒙孩子、引发思考

一个能吸引幼儿阅读的绘本必然是要充满童趣的，太成人化的教导反而会让幼儿失去阅读的兴趣。支持孩子在阅读中获得积极的情感体验，发展主动性、获得成功感是我们给你孩子真正的爱护。幼儿在绘本故事中得到了知识的启蒙，情感的体验，要做一个勤劳的人。

案例反思：

除了家长对于绘本的选择是非常重要的之外，家长也要融入孩子的阅读世界，站在孩子的角度上为孩子挑选书籍，另外耐心的陪伴也是非常重要的。家长可以通过不同的方式参与孩子的绘本阅读，例如可以根据绘本故事进行提问，或者模仿绘本故事中的人物等等。

孩子的家庭阅读也是非常重要的，家长在幼儿的早期阅读中也扮演着非常重要的角色，在和孩子们一起阅读的同时也可以锻炼孩子的语言能力和倾听能力。

第二篇：案例阅读

Connors v. Wilkinson(1978)

Spada,Judge.The issue raised in the case at bar is whether the owner of a motor vehicle seized by the police after a lawful arrest is liable to a private wrecker service operator for towing and storage charges. After a trial held on December 1,1977,the facts of the case could be summarized as follows：On March 5,1976,the plaintiff,a wrecker service operator,recived a call from the state police asking him to go to the defendant’s residence,to remove the named defendant’vehicle and to garage that vehicle until further notice.The named defendant had been involved earlier in an automobile accident on a public highway located approximately one mile from his home.The defendant's vehicle was towed by the plaintiff to his garage where it was inspected and examined by the police.Evidence adduced from the examination led to the defendant’s arrest on a criminal charge?It was further agreed that the defendant had never authorized or consented to the removal of his vehicle.In a separate proceeding the defendant’s vehicle was released to him after a bond was posted.

The plaintiff,on March 25,1976,instituted a small claims action against the defendant and his wife seeking $340 in damages for towing and service charges.The defendant and his wife concede that this sum is reasonable.The action was transferred on April 14,1977,to the regular docket of the Court of Common Pleas and was subsequently heared on December 1,1977.

The question of whether the owner of a motor vehicle seized from his garage by a private wrecker operator at the request of the police is obliged to pay for towing and storage charges is answered neither in the General Statutes nor in Connecticut case law.The plaintiff contends that his claim is authorized by General Statutes §14-150(b).This court cannot agree with that contention.

§14-150(b) states,in pertinent part,that“any state police officer,upon discovery of any motor vehicle,whether situated within or without any highway of this state,which is a menace to traffic,shall take such motor vehicle into his custody and may cause the same to be taken to and stored in a suitable place.”

The defendant’s vehicle was neither abandoned nor unregistered.Further more,the clause“which is a menace to traffic” limits the police power to remove only those vehicles which present a menace to traffic.The uncontradicted evidence established that the defendant’s vehicle was properly and safely garaged on his private property at the time the plaintiff seized it.It constituted no menace to traffic.

The plaintiff understandably argues that “the purpose of this statute seems to be to reimburse expenses to those who tow and store vehicles at

the direction of the poice.”That is a conclusion with which this court cannot agree.?

In further support of his claim,the plaintiff cites the decision of Bray v. Curtis.The facts of that case are easily distinguishable from those of the present case.In Bray,the police,after hot pursuit,arrested the defendant for drunk driving.At the conclusion of the chase the defendant’s vehicle was mired in the surf of a public beach.A wrecker service was dispatched to remove the vehicle and to garage it.

In a trial contesting the legality of the towing and storge charges,the Texas court found,not surprisingly,in favor of the wrecker service.The court made reference to article 6701d,§94,Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann.,wherein an arresting officer is empowered “to remove a vehicle from the scene of the arrest when the driver must be taken before a magistrate.”The Texas court found that“as part of the consideration for the privilege of driving a vehicle,a licensed driver impliedly agrees to allow a peace officer to have his vehicle towed and stored.?Otherwise,these vehicles would constitute a hazard to traffic and would be subject to theft,vandalism or in the case at bar destruction by the elements.”It is clear that the implied consent to tow one’s vehicle is dependent upon either the elimination of a traffic hazard or the creation of a benefit to the motor owner.

In the case before this court,neither circumstance was present to warrant an invocation of the “implied consent” theory of contract.The Brey case does not represent controlling authority to support the plaintiff’position.The plaintiff argues that a Connecticut operator “must agree to abide by the rules and regulations of the department of motor vehicles and of the state and local police.”No such rules or regulations were presented to the court for examination,nor is the court aware of any of which it might take judicial notice.?

Although the plaintiff failed to allege facts which could,if proven,contractually bind the defendant,this court feels compelled because of the significance of this case to examine the contractual relations,if any,between the parties.It is clear that no express contract existed between the plaintiff and the defendant.The evidence shows unassailably that the plaintiff towed away the defendant’s vehicle at the request of the police and contrary to the defendant’s express orders.

Do the circumstances warrant a finding of an implied contract？This court does not believe so.To render the party for whom services are performed liable as a debtor under an implied promise,“it is essential to show that they were rendered under such circumstances as to make it fairly presumable that the party receiving the benefit to be derived from them expected,or at least ought to have expected,that they were to be paid for.”(Sources omitted)

It is manifest that the defendant received no benefit.Conversely,the

deprivation of his motor vehicle caused him a severe hardship.If a benefit accrued,it inured to the police who initiated the seizure.

The possibility of a quasi-contract is discounted because of the absence of an unjust enrichment.The latter is an essential ingredient to support a claim founded on quasi contract.“It is clear that in order to recover on the basis of unjust enrichment,it is necessary for a plaintiff to demonstrate two aspects of the transaction.First,it must be shown that the defendant was benefited;that is,he has received something of value.And second,it must be shown that the benefit was unjust?” ：The court concludes that no basis of contract,express,implied or quasi,exists by which damages can be assessed in favor of the plaintiff.

Accordingly,judgement may enter in favor of both defendants.

Questions：

1. Why doesn’t General Statutes §14-150(b) apply in this case？

2. On what basis did the plaintiff sue the defendant?

3. In the opinion of the court here,why doesn’t the theory of quasi-contract apply in this case?

4.If the car had been wrongly parked on a highway,will the plaintiff win?If so,on what basis?

Palsgraf v.Long Island R.R.Co.

Court of Appeals of New York(1928)

248 N.Y. 339

Cardozo,C.J..Plaintiff was standing on a platform of defendant’s railroad after buying a ticket to go to Rockaway Beach.A train stopped at the station,bound for another place.Two men ran forward to catch it.One of the men reached the platform of the car without mishap,though the train was already moving.The other man,carrying a package,jumped aboard the car,but seemed unsteady as if about to fall.A guard on the car,who had held the door open,reached forward to help him in,and another guard on the platform pushed him from behind.In this act，the package fell upon the rails.It was a package of small size,about fifteen inches long,and was covered by a newspaper.In fact it contained fire works,but there was nothing in its appearance to give notice of its contents.The fireworks when they fell exploded.The shock of the explosion threw down some scales at the other end of the platform many feet away.The scales struck the plaintiff,causing injuries for which she sues.

The conduct of the defendant’s guard,if a wrong in its relation to the holder of the package,was not a wrong in its relation to the plaintiff,standing far away.Relatively to her it was not negligence at all.Nothing in the situation gave notice that the falling package had in it the potency of peril to persons thus

removed.Negligence is not actionable unless it involves the invasion of a legally protected interest,the violation of a right.

The plaintiff,as she stood upon the platform of the station,might claim to be protected against intentional invasion of her bodily security.Such invasion is not charged.She might claim to be protected against unintentional invasion by conduct involving in the thought of reasonable men and unreasonable hazard.These,from the point of view of the law,were the bounds of her immunity,with perhaps some rare exceptions?

“The ideas of negligence and duty are strictly correlative.”The plaintiff sues in her own right for a wrong personal to her,and not as the vicarious beneficiary of a breach of duty to another.

?In this case,the rights that are said to have been violated,the interests said to have been invaded,are not even of the same order.The man was not injured in his person or even put in danger.The purpose of the act,as well as its effect,was to make his person safe.If there was a wrong to him at all,which may very well be doubted,it was a wrong to a property interest only,the safety of his package.Out of this wrong to property,which threatened injury to nothing else,there has passed,we are told,to the plaintiff?a right of action for the invasion of an interest of anther order,the right to bodily security.?

The argument for the plaintiff is built upon the shifting meanings of such words as “wrong”and “wrongful”,and shares their instability.What the plaintiff must show is “a wrong” to herself ;i.e.,a violation of her own right,and not merely a wrong to someone else?Some acts,such as shooting,are so imminently dangerous to anyone?as to impose a duty of precision.?These cases aside,wrong is defined in terms of the natural or probable,at least when unintentional.The range of reasonable apprehension is at times a question for the court,and at times, if varying inferences are possible,a question for the jury.Here,?,there was nothing in the situation to suggest to the most cautious mind that the parcel wrapped in newspaper would spread wreckage through the station.If the guard had thrown it down knowingly and willfully,he would not have threatened the plaintiff’safety,so far as appearances could warn him.His conduct would not have involved,even then,an unreasonable probability of invasion of her bodily security.Liability can be no greater where the act is inadvertent.

Negligence ,like risk,is thus a term of relation.Negligence in the abstract,apart from things related,is surely not a tort,if indeed it is understandable at all.

The law of causation,remote or proximate,is thus foreign to the case before us.?If there is no tort to be redressed,there is no occasion to consider what damages might be recoverd if there were a finding of a tort.?

The judgment of the Appellate Division and that of the Trial Term

should be reversed,and the complaint dismissed,with costs in all courts.

Andrews,J.(dissenting).?We are told “there is no negligence unless there is in the particular case a legal duty to take care,and this duty must be one which is owed to the plaintiff himself and not merely to others” .This I think is too narrow a conception.Where there is the unreasonable act,and some right that may be affected,there is negligence whether damage does or does not result.?Should we drive down Broadway at a reckless speed,we are negligent whether we strike an approaching car or miss it by an inch.The act itself is wrongful.It is a wrong not only to those who happen to be within the radius of danger,but to all who might have been there—a wrong to the public at large.Such is the language of the street.Such is the language of the courts when speaking of contributory negligence.

Due care is a duty imposed on each one of us to protect society from unnecessary danger,not to protect A,B,or C alone.?

The proposition is this：Everyone owes to the world at large the duty of refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others.Such an act occurs.Not only is he wronged to whom harm might reasonably be expected to result,but he also who is in fact injured,even if he be outside what would generally be thought the danger zone.?

Unreasonably risk being taken,its consequences are not confined to those who might probably be hurt.An overturned lantern may burn all Chicago.We may follow the fire from the shed to the last building.We rightly say the fire started by the lantern caused its destruction.

A cause,but not the proximate cause.What we do mean by the word “proximate”is that,because of convenience,of public policy,of a rough sense of justice,the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point.This is not logic. It is practical politics.Take our rule as to fires.Sparks from my burning haystack set on fire my house and my neighbor’s. I may recover from a negligent railroad. He may not. Yet the wrongful act as directly harmed the one as the other. We may regret that the line was drawn just where it was, but drawn somewhere it had to be. We said the act of the railroad was not the proximate cause of our neighbour’s fire. Cause it surely was. The words we used were simply indicative of our notions of public policy. Other courts think differently.?

The act upon which defendant’s liability rests is knocking an apparently harmless package onto the platform. The act was negligent. For its proximate consequences the defendant is liable. If its contents were broken, to the owner; if it fell upon and crushed a passenger’s foot, then to him; if it exploded and injured one in the immediate vicinity, to him also?Mrs.Palsgraf was standing some distance away. How far cannot be told from the record—apparently 25 or 30 feet, perhaps less. Except for the explosion, she would not have been injured.?The only

intervening cause was that, instead of blowing her to the ground, the concussion smashed the weighing machine which in turn fell upon her. There was no remoteness in time, little in space.?

Under these circumstances I cannot say as a matter of law that the plaintiff’s injuries were not the proximate result of the negligence.?

The judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.

Questions：

1. What are the factors that made Judge Cardozo decide against

the plaintiff?

2. What is the starting point of the difference between Judge

Cardozo and Judge Andrews on this case?

3. How did Judge Andrews explain the concept of proximate cause?

4. Which judge do you agree with，Cardozo or Andrews? Why?