本科毕业设计（论文）外文翻译译文
学生姓名：
院（系）： 经济管理学院
专业班级： 市场营销0301班
指导教师：
完成日期： 2007年3 月22 日
日本的分销渠道
——对于进入日本市场的挑战与机会
Distribution Channels in Japan
Challenges and Opportunities for the
Japanese Market Entry
作者：Hokey Min
起止页码：P22-35
出版日期（期刊号）：0960-0035
出版单位：MCB Univercity Press
外文翻译译文：
介绍
尽管美国对日本的出口在过去两年已有大幅度的增长，然而美国对日本仍然存在着很大的贸易赤字。尽管没有出现下降趋势，但越来越多的美国决策者及商务经理已经开始审查日本的贸易活动。在这些人中，有一个很普遍的想法就是日本市场没有对美国产品开放，相反，美国市场对日本的贸易是开放的。因此，克林顿政府试图采取强硬措施来反对日本的一系列贸易活动，包括商业习惯和政府政策，还企图通过贸易制裁的威胁来反对日本产品。然而，这样的措施也会产生适得其反的结果。它不仅会为美国消费者带来更高的商品价格和更少的商品选择，同时也会增加日本消费者的反美情绪。最近Ginkota和Kotabe的调查表明：单独的贸易谈判不会提高美国商品进入日本市场的能力。而对于提高美国公司进入日本市场能力的一个行之有效的方法就是研究日本近几个世纪以来所采用的商业活动。
由于法律障碍或者是日本公司对外封锁商业渠道，日本当地的分销渠道往往对外国公司不利，而这样的商业活动被认为是进入日本市场的主要障碍。事实上，Yamawaki美国商品成功出口到日本市场在很大程度上取决于美国解决协议合同的能力。尽管进入日本市场意义重大，然而对西方人而言，日本的经销体系经常会被人误以为是充满神秘感的。这种误解源于日本复杂的分销惯例特征。而这种分销惯例沿袭古老的而又严谨的建设体系。在尝试美国贸易在日本市场成功获利减少不必要的贸易冲突过程中，我们揭露了日本分销中获利的事实，探索出了能成功进入日本市场的战略性武器。
日本分销渠道结构的概述
与美国典型的开放独立和利润趋向化的分销渠道相比，日本的分销渠道被认为是长期、复杂的关系趋向化网状系统，有许多贸易伙伴是批发商、经纪人、生产商、进口商、零售商密切联系的中间负责人。在这种分销渠道中，一般包括四层或超过四层的批发商。批发渠道的相对长度一般由工业类型、渠道内部成员的金融连接、零售规模、生产上的规模等因素来决定的。日本这种错综复杂的分销渠道深深地根植于日本文化所建立在商业习惯基础上的社会地位之中。在下一个部分我们将讨论日本分销渠道独特的方面及构成这些方面的根源所在。
批发商的支配地位
尽管批发商在功能性角色中期的作用很小，但是他们通过纵向合并、金融联系、互惠处理等方法长期控制着日本的分销渠道。例如，在1998年时，日本的批发商总销售量相差3.1倍，而美国的批发商销售量基本上是一样的。据Ito和Maluyama报道，有41.9％的日本批发商购买来自其他批发商的商品，而美国只有24.8％批发商购买来自其他批发商的物品。批发商之间的频繁贸易意味着更有力的直接分销机会。事实上，日本的零售商购买的商品中有92％来自于批发商，而在美国零售商所购买的商品中只有23％来源于批发商。在日本经商的64%的美国公司在某中程度上，是通过日本批发商将他们的商品分销到日本销售者手中的。
由于缺乏对地区分销的控制，要在很大程度上依赖日本本土的批发商，这已经成为外国公司进入日本市场的绊脚石。尽管如此，由于日本在改革分销结构方面步伐很慢，所以建立一个独立的分销渠道对于许多想要进入日本市场的外国公司来说仍然不是一个切实可行的选择，这些主要原因包括：
（1） 通过所谓的”keiretsu”网状系统，生产商、批发商和零售商通常会被互惠的贸易责任联系在一起。然而这种网状系统控制了从生产到零售上的产品分销。也就是说，如果外国公司没有将自身融入到一系列的keiretsu网状系统分销中，那么他们的商品要到日本消费者手中会面临很大的困难。然而这种融入加盟，由于日本keiretus的管理哲学、经营范围、关系建立和法律权限的不同，可能会对外国公司造成一些管理上的风险。
（2） 由于企业仓库管理法规定，公司需获得建立仓库许可证方可在日本市场上进行批发业务。这个基本原理是批发商谈论仓库中遇到的困难。
（3） 保持不断的对零售商供应小额数量的各类物品。与美国相比，日本对批发商的需要大的多。这个基本原理是批发商能够从生产商那里购买大量的商品，然后分成小额数量卖给零售商的原因。
复杂的批发商层级关系
在日本有四种不同水平的批发商：贸易公司，主要批发商、二等批发商、三等批发商。贸易公司是大的批发中间媒介，一般从事各种各样的商品贸易，包括把原材料合成品分销到小的批发商。根据shao和herbig的调查显示，日本有超过8000家的贸易公司，而在这些公司中，有16家积极从事对外贸易，被称为”sugo slwsha”。他们中的大多数，例如三菱和三井源于”zaibatsu”水平垂直综合化体系。二战结束前这个组织主宰了整个日本商品的生产和分销行业。”sogo shosha”的基本功能包括：贸易宣传，市场咨询，存货清单维护，货运提出，以及技术引进。
由于工业需要或者由于keiretsu的间接关系，额外的批发量可能会涉及到使sugo slwsha与多种产品的零售商和工业买者相符合。主要批发商有时会购买大批量的同一品牌商品，然后将这些产品分销给中层批发商或者是工业买者。在下一个环节中，二等批发商主要从批发商手中买到各种商品，然后在将这些产品分销到三等批发商手中。在一些行业中，如渔业，主要批发商让主要经济人将渔产品分销到二等批发商手中是批发渠道的最开始，三等批发商将递交各种小额数量的商品到总店，因为总店维持大的库存量，传递速度快，接受未售出货物，然后派他们自己的员工去帮助总店的促销活动。
根据以上所属的批发贸易的额外步骤，批发的利润会提高，并最终增加消费的零售价格。就这样，日本多层次的批发渠道经常受到西方人的严厉批评。事实上，batzer和lanmer表示日本的批发渠道能够使商品价格增加60%，而达到300%—500%的进口地价。然而，这种多层次的渠道为日本的零售商提供了很大的优势，如下：
● 通过多层次的批发渠道，主要是处于下层的三等批发商能够负担的起一些小额数量的交易，例如自行车、小型摩托车，而这些中小型的交易服务能够帮助一些库存量有限的零售商。
● 这种多层次的批发渠道将批发商和分散于日本各个地区的零售商联接在一起，通过快的谈判和break.bulking可以使商品很快实现从生产－零售－消费的过程。
● 密切地联系促使多层次批发渠道中的各个成员从分到有关的产品的信息、革新、竞争以及市场机遇。因此他将帮助日本零售商提供更多的流水线化的客户服务。
异常多的小零售商店
在1989年时，日本有大概1620000个零售店，平均每10000个日本人就有132个零售店，而在美国共有约1542000个零售店，每10000个美国居民建立了66个商店，在日本，面积不到3200平方英尺的小零售商店占总零售店56％，而在美国这个数字却不到3％，他们包括了90.6％的总零售店。这些数据清楚地表明日本零售也是分散地，并且极小的零售商控制，这些零售商往往资金规模小，却十分方便地位于居点的邻里之后。日本领地有如此多的小零售店有如下一些原因：
社会福利的一种形式
自1985年起，6329万日本人被零售业全职雇佣。换句话说，日本小零售店的劳动力从业比率比较高。渐入老年的日本退休者建立并经营零售店。因此尽管经营效率低，政府还是竭力保护小型零售商店，因为他们为日本社会提供了大部分的安全工作和人民收入。
日本人的购物行为
由于严重的交通堵塞和对新鲜产品的偏爱，日本消费者更乐于选择在家附近的商店购物，他们特别挑剔，通常期望从零售商那里享受高质量的服务。这些服务包括免费送货，6小时内送货、限时送货、休息日服务、导购、无限期保证、售后跟踪业务等。在日本，零售店通常在销售商品之余还提供这种服务，深受消费者喜爱。因此，不可避免得大量小规模零售店在日本迅速发展起来。
另外，koyama观察到，在许多大家庭里，日本消费者喜欢储存各种不同的商品。例如，一个普通的日本家庭存有800种商品，而一个德国或法国家庭只有大约600种，这表明日本消费者要求更多样化的生产线。一个典型的日本家庭拥有一套款式多样、设计独特的咖啡杯、茶杯和酒杯。为满足需求，许多小零售店转变生产线路，生产更多样化的具有地方特色的商品。而这对于规模大的零售商是极不经济的。事实上，大多数小的零售商的产品另类精细，款型独特，满足了地方居民的需求。换言之，日本人的这一需求将大大促使各种小而精的零售店的出现。
大规模零售店法规
对日本零售业影响最大的法规就是大规模零售店法，其明文规定，开办大规模零售店起点面面积必须在500平方米以上。国际贸易和产业部监督法规的实行，但还是给予地方政府权利将占地面积降到300或200平方米。更糟的是MITI规定正规零售店得到许可，开始经营之至近几年由于被法规限制了向大超市这样大规模零售店的建立，大量小型零售店纷纷出现。日本政府担心大零售店可能相互征战，随之导致传统的分销制度的破坏，因而出台了大规模零售店法，但是小规模店主导日本零售业，严重阻碍了新的市场参与者特别是外国公司将其产品销售给日本消费者。由于小型零售店单一的商品选择，而无异于购入许多国外产品。
不过，日本政府已经开始放宽对大规模零售店增长的法律限制。就在美日双方《战略性妨碍主动性》会谈之后，日本MITI同意将大规模店申请人证书办理期缩短至18个月，同时允许零售商延长营业时间。因此，不久前，大零售店申请骤加50％，这一连续性政策的放宽为一些非日公司提供了机会。同时，日本零售业的影响力大大提高，正如Toys”R”US公司已经在日本玩具市场占有一席之地。
Keiretsu分销网络
近来，onkvisi和show惊人发现仅有70％的日本产品收到了政府的保护，许多美国公司纷纷抱怨由于日本本地强大的keiretsu销售网的阻碍，很难打入日本市场。Keiretsu通常是指有一些相互联系的国内公司组成的大的集团。这些公司只会求共同利益，于同一银行存在生意往来，其董事会之间相互交流并坚持广泛地公平参与管理集团，根据他们的结构和原则，kerietsu销售网又分为两种类型：水平型和垂直型。水平型公司长在同一家银行周围，可以在完全不同的领域行使不同的职责。这些公司形成联盟限制了非网内成员的业务往来，这一形式遭到了许多美国公司和政府的严厉谴责。但与美国不同，日本政府没有严格执行反倾销法，大批象三菱、三星、sanwa、太极kangyo和富士已经成功采用水平型keiretsu系统。
与水平型keiretsu不同，垂直型keiretsu通常是有一个主要的工业公司和他的供应商或经销商组成，特别是像汽车业、电子业等领域的企业，很容易形成这种体系。keiretsu可更进一步分为供应型和分销型。前者有一个主要的生产商（例如东芝、日立、尼桑、丰田等）支配，并且有一系列供应商连接成的集团。
然而供应型和分销型keiretsu有不同之处，后者与他的上边供应商有着利益上的衔接，而前者注重发展与下游经销商和零售商的关系网。相比之下，分销型keiretsu倾向于迫使国内外非kerietsu公司退出竞争，他们在零售价格方面达成一致，维持了消费品的高价，很大程度上说，分销型kerietsu造成了分销效率。即便如此，日本传统分销形势仍然为日本商业界广泛接受。尽管这是管理模式带来较低的经济效率，他还是为其成员公司提供了丰沛的经营利润。
技术与信息传递
制造者、批发商、零售商如果没有一个稳定、长期合作关系、分销keiretsu注定会失败，因此密切地伙伴关系是分销的基础。这种密切关系只能通过keiretsu成员之间的公开交流，技术的信息共享建立起来。例如：日本制造商经常提供先进的零售技术，这涉及到对在线数据处理系统的电脑业。该系统为零售商提供了关于消费者行为、单位资本消费额和用户信息记录的点对销路（POS）信息，而且最近一些日本公司利用POS发展起来了电子预定系统(EOS)以补充存活清单，缩短传输时间和降低交付成本。实际上，Milgrom和Roberts注意到通过在成员之间传输信息与技术，keiretsu对新的市场机会作出反应时十分有效。
金融风险共享
通过相互分享股权、分销鼓励他们的成员不必担心竞争对手的接管，因此注重他们的长期利益。如新产品销售与分销，很多制造者传统上为他们的成员提供多种形式的金融帮助，如信贷扩展、接受延伸、支付的期票让许多可自由支配的回扣和无常退还还未售出的商品的特权，这样的帮助将帮助成员度过资金难关。
稳定地有需求的商品供应
通过独家经销的模式，keiretsu制造商可以确保他下游的经销人和零售商有专卖的市场需求的商品的供应。正如Dorney Derytimers合作伙伴创始人，简明的说：在外国市场上成功依赖于公司意识到并能处理进入市场的特征，那个能力在日本更为重要，因为日本被分成零碎的市场部分，每一个市场部分都有自己独特的分销文化，风格和领域，考虑到这些，外国公司不仅要在最有吸引力市场部分上开发，也要在过后的扩大分销上集中用力，然而这些努力要有数年时间才能有所回报。
日本市场的渗透策略
日本一年内取得比他们八年前多买一倍的美国产品。据说与很多美国人所想的相反，这个数据表明日本市场并不是进不去。尽管大多数西方人对日本市场经营与分销战略不满意，这里仍有个希望增加的标志，例如据报道一些美国公司在日本赚钱比在美国赚钱还要多。另外其他许多美国公司由于把市场重点调整了，而多了一分市场份额。
最近在日本市场上销售成功的不仅限于美国公司，一批正在增加的欧洲公司与亚洲公司凭借他们对产品质量和种类的承诺已经在日本得到一个强大的立足点，这些公司包括德国汽车制造商bmw，意大利运动衣生产商fila,比利时巧克力生产商dalloyau，法国化妆品公司loreal和台湾自行车制造商giant。随之变化的是其他美国公司通过采取下属许多新的市场营销分销战略来占领更大的日本市场分额。
瞄准专业的适当的市场
瞄准市场中被忽略的部分已经证明对一些日本经营公司是成功地战略。例如总部设在佐治亚洲哥伦布的美国家庭人手保险公司，开始在日本出手癌症保险单。尽管有多于每年3900亿美元的日本保险市场，外国公司通常站不到3％的份额。日本市场上不寻常的成功原因在于AFLAC公司认识到了被迫竞争基本上忽略了附加的癌症保险的重要性，他们都注重于典型的生命与健康保险，因此AFLAC公司被允许出手癌症保险单。这些保险单包括最初被诊断为癌症的患者，因为销售这些保险单不再与日本保险公司形成直接的销售竞争。
在日本商标名称下的销售
虽然较少向夸耀性消费倾斜，但是日本消费者倾向于显示对大公司生产的带有著名商标的和好的外观商品的极大尊重，而这样的大公司往往碰巧就是一些有名的日本企业，考虑到日本消费者对品牌的忠诚，一些亚洲公司，如韩国的电子制造商和香港的服装生产商，在日语商标名称下成功出手了他们的产品，但是在日语商标名称下销售意味着外国公司将他们的所有的营销与分销任务都授予了当地的日本营销商。因此外国企业控制他的产品，如何营销与分销的能力将受到很大的束缚，同时外国公司在日本市场占领强有力的立足点的机会可能会减弱，因此也就不能对抗消费者对他的品牌的忠诚。
强调后续服务
尽管福特三大汽车制造商扩大了国式车在日本的销售，他们的市场份额依然很小，这其中重要原因就是美国汽车生产商在改进售后服务等方面缺乏努力。例如Inoue Aubtorama的高级总经理就指出，收到福特车的零部件通常要这些商品包括高质量的名牌产品，相比而言，普通的品牌质量，未知的商品，日本人对这些名牌产品更加青睐。Keiretsu系统保证了长期的稳定与安全。由此Keiretsu制造商能将他下游的经销人和零售商置于他的保护之下，并确保2－3周，而要求日本生产的汽车零部件只要2－3天，另一方面：BWM提供了297万美元来改进他们的售后服务，包括快速的不见交换，这一努力可能会帮助他们成为日本的第一汽车生产商。
“Piggybacking”
为了了解日本的分销渠道，一些美国公司与另一些已经在日本建立他们自己的分销渠道的美国公司联系在了一起。例如加州蓝钻杏仁种植者公司与coca-cola联手通过cocacola’s在日本建立好的分销系统，充分利用了零食与软饮料的互补性，结果蓝钻石公司成功实现了它十年占有日本市场40％的目标。在另外一例中，美国上电公司与日本7－11公司一起通过7－11公司已经建立好的分销网从客户那里得到了订单。
如上所述的那样，背负式发展战略是战胜日本分销渠道的有效方法。然而这种战略也不是没有缺陷。例如背负式发展对于不是当代产品的生产线的机会十分有限，该方式中的背负方对于他的分销系统操作控制有限，还要对分销服务进行补偿。
直接出售给 non-keiretsu连锁店或 “cash-and-carry”批发商
直接售后补偿不包括许多日本传统国产品牌的产品，所谓的现付现运批发商已经呈现为日本批发部门的主要部门力量。他们通过绕开传统的多层次的分销渠道，利用折扣店分销外国进口店，从而复订的正常的规范标准，因为他们并不附属于keiretsu分销网，许多被Keiretsu派出的外国公司就会通过个人的现付现运批发商向Wtoile kaito公司来分销他们的产品。实际上Stone注意到韩国的电视生产商和台湾的电脑生产上都利用他们的独立的批发商将他们的产品卖给日本消费者。
与此相似，非Keiretsu的零售巨头像Daiei、Ito-Yokado,和 Aeiyu从亚洲的邻国买来价值20亿5千万美元的商品，然后以他们的商标名称以折扣价成功出售，尽管日本消费者与他们的美国同行相比价格优势并不好，但是上述的分销形势已经在日本流行开来。由于日本经济政治衰退以及他们生活方式的逐渐变化，日本消费者也开始变的对价格敏感起来。然而尽管有诸多优点，外国的出口商对日本未授权经营者的高度依赖可能会损坏消费者对他们产品的可信度。因为未授权的经营者的分销渠道中的消费者可能会被排除在售后服务不合格产品和产品回收之外。
直接营销
一些外国公司，如Day timers,Amay和Dtto uersand对日本复杂的分销体系感到十分吃惊。他们发展了一系列直接经营的技术来直接到达日本消费者，向电信营销，白天电视购物，挨户推销，院内摊点以及邮购等。尽管1987年只占日本零售的1％，它却极现希望。据日本劳工部统计，直销零售已从1983－1988年翻了一番，直接营销在数额上极大增加是由于保证了成员之间的长期伙伴关系，那就是说Keiretsu成员经销人与零售商很可能在一个稳定地基础设施上进行他们的交货，由此能够适应用户的需求。由于越来越多的日本妇女忙于工作而很少有时间购物，日本的直接营销零售额激增。事实上，Dodwell营销顾问称超过50%的工作女性至少每年在网上订购一次商品，而只有30%的男性用这种形式订购。有例子表明，许多日本女性不善于在公众场合购买内衣物及丝织品，更不愿去零售店购物。因此，这些商品成为邮件订购，公司直接营销的绝佳选择。
尽管如此，许多直接营销战术仍需调整。比如，远程营销目标锁定日本家庭妇女，她们容易受到陌生电话的困扰。邮件订购也引发了许多问题，因为邮递费用通常很高，第三等级缺乏，而且在日本想得到直接订购的机会是很难的。
结论
近年来，美日两国政府间举行了围绕结构化阻碍创造性这个问题的会谈，美国决策者们将日本分销制度对美国贸易的阻碍作为重要的议题与日本进行双边谈判。然而许多有意进入市场的美国公司往往忽略了将消费品市场准入障碍转化成其打入市场的有利因素。这主要因为西方人对这种深深根植与日本历史文化传统中的分销系统知之甚少。比如，美国人习惯把这种制度看成封闭自守的表现，而日本人则认为这是至关社会持续和谐发展的高度合作的表现。日本文化的根基与美国截然不同，因此，单单站在美国的角度去评价日本的分销系统的好坏是很不成熟的。就德国人看来，日本的分销系统表现出对消费者的高度责任感，体现出合作、公平的原则。
既然认识到了这些原则，外国公司应需重新调整其分销、营销战术，以适应当今日本的标准和规范。这样，美国公司必须增加与在日本经营的国内外公司的相互依赖性，从而，达到双方信息互换的效果，这样公司才能加深对于市场竞争、消费者需求、分销动向等方面的了解。再者，美国公司不仅应该将其工作重点从短期利益—成本节约转换到长期收益和公司稳定上来，而且应该重新检验其惯用渠道，从而创造出最符合长期发展目标的、高效的分销渠道。
Distribution Channels in Japan
Challenges and Opportunities for the
Japanese Market Entry
Hokey Min
Department of Marketing and Transportation,
College of Business, Auburn University, Auburn,
Alabama, USA
Introduction
Despite the fact that US exports to Japan have jumped greatly in the last two years, the USA still has a large trade deficit with Japan. As it does not appear to be in decline, a growing number of US policy makers and business managers have begun to scrutinize Japanese trade practices. A prevailing thought among them is that the Japanese market is not open to US products, whereas the US market is open to Japanese products. As such, the Clinton administration attempted to develop tough measures against a whole web of Japanese trade practices, business customs, and government policies, through a threat of trade sanctions against Japanese products. Such measures, however, can backfire because they may not only result in higher prices and fewer choices for American consumers, but also increase anti-US sentiment among Japanese consumers. The recent survey conducted by Czinkota and Kotabe indicates that trade negotiations alone will not enhance the ability of US firms to enter the Japanese market. A more effective way of enhancing the ability of US firms to penetrate the Japanese market is to study the business practices that the Japanese have adopted over the centuries.
One business practice that is perceived to be a major obstacle in entering the Japanese market is an indigenous form of distribution channel which often disfavours foreign firms because of legal impediments, or the channel member’s “locked-up” relationship with Japanese firms. In fact, Yamawaki affirms that the success of US exports to Japan largely depends on the US ability to overcome those distributional entry barriers. Despite its significance to Japanese market access, the Japanese distribution system is often misunderstood or found to be mystifying by Westerners. Such a misunderstanding is due to the complex and idiosyncratic nature of the distribution practices that have evolved from the ancient, self-contained feudal system. In an effort to help US businesses succeed in the lucrative Japanese market and ease unnecessary trade conflicts, we unveil facts and fallacies of Japanese distribution and explore strategic weapons that may be essentials to the successful penetration of the Japanese market.
An overview of Japanese distribution channel structures
In contrast to the typical US distribution channel which is open, independent, and margin-driven, the Japanese distribution channel is often characterized as a long, complicated network of relation-driven middle men who are interacting closely with “fellow-trade” wholesalers, brokers, manufacturers, importers, and retailers. Within this channel, it is not uncommon to include as many as four layers of wholesalers. The relative lengths (or stages) of wholesaler channels are usually determined by the industry type, the financial linkages among channel members, the size of the retailer, and the size and brand recognition of the manufacturer. Such intricacy of the Japanese distribution channel is deeply rooted in the Japanese culture and socio-economic setting that underlies Japanese business customs. In the next subsections, we will highlight the unique aspects of the Japanese distribution channel and from where these unique structures have evolved.
Dominance of wholesalers
Even if wholesalers contributed little to functional performance, they have long controlled the Japanese distribution channel through vertical integration, financial linkage, and reciprocity dealings. In 1988, for example, total wholesaler sales volume in Japan was estimated to be 3.1 times total retail sales volume, while US wholesaler sales volume was about the same as its retail sales volume. Ito and Maruyama also reported that while 41.9 percent of Japanese wholesaler purchases came from other wholesalers, only 24.8 per cent of US wholesaler purchases originated from other wholesalers. More frequent trading among wholesalers means little direct distribution opportunities.In fact, Japanese retailers purchased 92 per cent of their merchandisefrom wholesalers, while US counterparts bought only 23 per cent from their wholesalers. As such, 64 per cent of the US firms operating in Japan indicate that they are dependent to some degree on the Japanese wholesalers in distributing their products to Japanese consumers.
Due to a lack of control over local distribution/sales operations, heavy reliance on the wholesalers has become a major stumbling block for foreign firms entering the Japanese market. Nevertheless, with the slow pace of structural changes in Japanese distribution, establishment of a “non-captive”, independent distribution channel is still not a viable option for many foreign firms which would like to enter the Japanese market. Some major reasons include:
(1) Through a so-called “keiretsu” network, manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers are often tied by reciprocal trade obligations and therefore such a network controls product distribution/sales from factory doors to retail outlets. That is to say, foreign firms may face severe difficulty in reaching Japanese consumers without aligning themselves with a web of distribution keiretsu networks. Such alignment, however, may pose some managerial risk for foreign firms due to the Japanese keiretsu partner’s different management philosophy, business scope, relationship building, and legal boundary.
(2) Due to the Warehouse Industry Law that requires firms to obtain permits to establish warehouses and to register warehouse fees with the Japanese government, foreign firms may run into difficulty in establishing and operating their own warehouses.
(3) To keep the constant supply to retailers who usually order in small quantities with wide assortments, the need for wholesalers is much greater in Japan than in the USA. The rationale is that wholesalers can purchase in large quantities from manufacturers and divide them into smaller quantities that are sold to retailers.
Complex layers of wholesalers
There are four different levels of wholesalers in Japan; trading companies, primary (initial) wholesalers, secondary (intermediate) wholesalers, and tertiary (final) wholesalers. Trading companies are large wholesale intermediaries which normally distribute a wide spectrum of products encompassing raw materials and finished goods to smaller wholesalers. According to Shao and Herbig, there exist more than 8,000 trading companies in Japan. Among these, the 16 largest ones actively engaged in foreign trade are called “sogo shosha” (general trading companies). Most of them, such
as Mitsubishi and Mitsui, evolved from horizontally and vertically integrated “Zaibatsu” organizations which dominated both production and distribution until the end of the Second World War. The basic functions of sogo shosha include trade promotion, market consulting, inventory maintenance,freight forwarding, information gathering, and technology acquisition.
Depending on the industry need or the keiretsu connection, additional wholesale layers may be involved in matching sogo shosha to retailers or industry buyers of a variety of products. The primary wholesaler sometimes purchases only one brand of merchandise in large quantities and supplies the merchandise to either secondary wholesalers or industrial buyers. At the succeeding stage, the secondary wholesaler consolidates a variety of goods from primary wholesalers and diffuses the merchandise to tertiary wholesalers.In certain industries, such as the fisheries, the primary wholesaler can contract out to primary brokers to get fish products to the secondary wholesalers. At the exit of the wholesale channel, the tertiary wholesaler delivers a wide assortment of goods in small quantities to “mom-and-pop” stores. It also maintains large inventories, makes a quick delivery, accepts unsold goods, and sends some of its employees to help promote special sales for mom-and-pop stores.
With additional steps of wholesale trading described above, the wholesale margin can increase and consequently raise retail prices for Japanese consumers. As such, the multilayered wholesale channel in Japan is often harshly criticized by many Westerners. In fact, Batzer and Laumer implied that the Japanese wholesale channel could add as much as 60 per cent to the price of products and add up to 300 to 500 per cent to the landed price of imports. The multilayered wholesale channel, however, offers some important advantages for Japanese retailers. These are:
? Through the multilayered channel, downstream tertiary wholesalers can afford to make small deliveries of less than truckload quantities on a frequent basis via non-conventional transportation modes such as bicycles and motor scooters. Such delivery service would help small mom-and-pop retailers with limited space replenish inventories without carrying them.
? The multilayered wholesale channel links the wholesalers to atomistic retailers scattered all over the Japanese islands and, through quick negotiations and break-bulking, helps move the product rapidly from production to retail and consumption.
? The close linkage among the multilayered channel members encourages the sharing of information on product trends, innovations, competition,and overall market opportunities. Thus it will help the Japanese retailer provide more streamlined customer services.
Unusually large number of small retail stores
As of 1989, there were 132 retail stores for every 10,000 Japanese people and a total of approximately 1,620,000 retail stores in Japan, while the USA has 66 retail establishments per 10,000 residents and a total of about 1,542,000 retail stores. In Japan, small retail stores of less than 3,200 square feet account for 56 per cent of total retail sales as compared with 3 per cent for the USA. They also comprise 99.6 per cent of total retail stores. These statistics clearly suggest that the Japanese retail industry is highly fragmented and dominated by small retailers which are often undercapitalized, but conveniently located in the back of residential neighbourhoods. There are a number of reasons why the Japanese retail industry has so many small retail stores:
A form of social welfare
As of 1985, 6,329,000 Japanese were employed on a full-time basis by the retail sector. In other words, a labour-force-participation ratio for the small retail stores is relatively high in Japan. Many retail stores were established and operated by ageing Japanese retirees. Therefore, regardless of economic inefficiency, many small retailers have been protected by the government because they provide secure jobs and income for a large segment of Japanese society.
Japanese shopping behaviour
Owing to notorious traffic congestion and preference for fresh products such as “sushi and sashimi”, Japanese consumers tend to shop in the immediate vicinity of their homes. They are also very choosy and have a penchant for a high level of services. Services that they normally expect to receive from retailers include freeof-charge delivery, less than six hours for delivery, delivery time designation, offhour handling, aid in product selection, unlimited warranty, and post-sale followup transactions. Since mom-and-pop stores usually provide such services beyond the act of simply offering goods for sale, the abundance of small-scale mom-and-pop stores is an inevitable phenomenon in Japan.
In addition, Koyama observes that Japanese consumers tend to possess many different items at home due in part to the extended family structure; for example, an average Japanese household keeps about 800 belongings, while a German or French counterpart has around 600 belongings. This suggests that Japanese consumers often require more diversified product lines. For example,the typical Japanese household may need to keep several different types of cups specially designed for coffee, ceremonial tea, and “sake”. As such, many small retailers altered their product lines to diversify and have begun to carry locally produced specialty items which are too uneconomic for large retail stores to include as part of their product lines. In fact, most of the small Japanese retailers are specialized and carry relatively deep assortments to satisfy local demand. In other words, Japanese demand for more diversified products may have led to the various establishments of small but specialized retail shops.
Large Scale Retail Store Law
The most important regulation affecting Japanese retailing is the Large Scale Retail Store Law that regulates the opening and expansion of large-scale retail stores with their floor space exceeding 500 square metres (i.e. 5,400 square feet). This law is usually overseen by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), but they also give authority to the local prefecture government which can further lower the requirement to 300 and 200 square metres. To make matters worse, MITI’s notification process for the formal approval of planned stores can take 14 months to 20 months or more. As a result, only 11 large retail stores were permitted to open in the whole of Japan during 1985 through 1988. Until recent years, this regulation has helped sustain a large number of small-scale retail stores in Japan by systematically restricting the establishment of large-scale retail stores, such as department stores (see Figure 2 for various forms of Japanese retailing). Such regulation may have originated from the government’s fear of a retail price war spurred by large stores and the subsequent disruption of traditional Japanese distribution culture. The dominance of small stores in the Japanese retail sector often hampers the new market entrants, such as foreign firms, from selling their products to Japanese consumers, because small stores tend to keep only a limited selection of merchandise and consequently cannot afford to carry foreign products.
The Japanese government, however, has begun to relax the law regulating the growth of large-scale retail stores. In the wake of the Strategic Impediments Initiative (SII) talks between the USA and Japan, Japan’s MITI agreed to limit the approval process for large-store applications to under 18 months and allowed the retailers to extend their store hours; consequently, applications for the large stores soared by 50 per cent in the recent past. The continual relaxation of the large-scale retail store law would present an opportunity non-Japanese firms to increase their leverage in the Japanese retail sector, as evidenced by the growing presence of Toys “R” Us in the Japanese toy market.
Good ol’ boys distribution network called keiretsu
Surprisingly, Onkvisit and Shaw recently observed that only 7 per cent of Japan’s manufactured goods were protected by the Japanese government, while 34 per cent of the products manufactured in the USA were protected by the US government. A number of US firms have reported their difficulty in cracking the Japanese market and their complaints focused on the strong local distribution network called “keiretsu” which is a significant market barrier. In general, keiretsu are referred to as a large group of related companies which share common interests, common banks, and typically, interlocking boards of directors and cross-equity participation. Depending on their formation and principles, keiretsu are commonly divided into two types: horizontal and vertical. The horizontal keiretsu are usually organized around a bank and consist of a variety of companies that perform different functions in diverse fields. Since the horizontal keiretsu resemble cartels in that they tend to restrict business interactions with non-keiretsu organizations, they have been sharply criticized by many US business and political leaders. Unlike the US government, the Japanese government loosely enforced its anti-trust laws, and consequently a number of Japanese firms such as Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Sanwa, Dai-chi Kangyo, and Fuji, have successfully used the horizontal keiretsu system.
Unlike the horizontal keiretsu, the vertical keiretsu are usually composed of a major industrial corporation and its suppliers or distributors/retailers in a particular industry such as automobiles and electronics. The vertical keiretsu can be further subdivided into supply keiretsu and distribution keiretsu. Supply keiretsu are groups of companies integrated along a supply chain dominated by a major manufacturer such as Toyota, Nissan, Toshiba, and Hitachi.
In contrast to the supply keiretsu which have interlocking interests in their upstream suppliers, the distribution keiretsu develop the web of relationships with their downstream distributors and retail outlets. Since the distribution keiretsu tend to exclude non-keiretsu companies (both foreign and domestic) from competition and tend to keep retail prices high for consumers through the retail price maintenance agreement, the distribution keiretsu may be the important cause of distribution inefficiency. Nevertheless, the Japanese traditional culture often values mutual trust and loyalty created by the distribution keiretsu (see Table I). Therefore, it is still an accepted form of business practice in Japan where a paternalistic business relationship developed by the distribution keiretsu precedes its economic inefficiency. Distribution keiretsu offer various managerial benefits for the participating members which include:
Technology and information transfer
Without the foundation for a stable, long-term, and co-operative relationship among the manufacturer, the wholesaler, and the retailer, the distribution keiretsu are doomed to failure. Accordingly, a close partnership is the cornerstone of distribution keiretsu. Such a partnership can only be established by mutual information and technology sharing through open communication among the keiretsu members. For example, Japanese manufacturers often supply advanced retail support involving computerized online data processing systems that provide retailers point-of-sale (POS) information about consumer behaviour, per capital sales, and customer credit. Furthermore, some progressive Japanese firms have recently developed electronic ordering systems (EOS) with POS to supplement inventory, shorten delivery time, and reduce delivery errors. In fact, Milgrom and Roberts note that the keiretsu have proven to be extremely effective in responding to new market opportunities by transferring information and technology among the members.
Financial risk sharing
Through mutual share holding, distribution keiretsu encourage their members to not worry about hostile takeovers and subsequently focus on their long-term interests such as new product marketing and distribution. Also, many manufacturers traditionally provide their keiretsu members with several forms of financial assistance, such as credit extension, acceptance of promissory notes with deferred payments, discretionary rebates, and return privileges of unsold products at no cost. Such assistance will help the keiretsu members survive through tough financial times.
Stable supply of the needed merchandise
The keiretsu manufacturer can assure its downstream distributors and retailers a constant supply of the needed merchandise through exclusive dealings. Such merchandise often includes high quality brand name products that many Japanese consumers tend to favour over the unknown quality of obscure brand products. With the long-term stability and security guaranteed by the keiretsu system, the keiretsu manufacturer can bring its downstream distributors and retailers under its wing and thus assure long-term partnership with its members. That is to say, keiretsu member distributors and retailers are likely to adapt their delivery schedule to the requirements of their customers on a stable basis.
Japanese market penetration strategies
In the past year, Japanese bought twice as many US products ($47.9 billion in total) as they did about eight years ago. As opposed to what many Americans allegedly believe, this statistic indicates that the Japanese market is not impenetrable. Although a majority of Japanese consumers may not be content with Western-style marketing and distribution strategies, there is an increasing sign of hope. For example, several US firms, such as Coca-Cola, Salomon Brothers, and Toys “R” Us, are reported to make more profits in Japan than in the USA. In addition, many other US firms such as McDonald’s, Schick, IBM, Xerox, Motorola, Bose, and Johnson & Johnson have captured the number one market share in Japan thanks to their emphasis on customized marketing tailored for Japanese consumers. The recent marketing success in Japan is not limited to US firms. A growing number of European and Asian firms have begun to attain a strong foothold in Japan through their strong commitment to product quality and variety. These firms include the German automaker, BMW; the Italian sportswear producer, Fila; the Belgian chocolate maker, Dalloyau; the French cosmetic firm, L’Oreal, and the Taiwanese bicycle manufacturer, Giant. Following suit, other US firms can capture a larger share of the Japanese market by adopting a number of proactive marketing/distribution strategies described below.
Targeting specialized niche markets
Targeting the neglected segment of the Japanese market has proven to be a successful strategy for some US firms operating in Japan. For example,American Family Life Assurance Company (AFLAC) based in Columbus,Georgia, began to sell cancer insurance policies in Japan where cancer is the number one killer. Although foreign firms used to share less than 3 percent of Japan’s $390 billion-a-year insurance market, AFLAC found a way to insure 28 million Japanese primarily for cancer, roughly 22 per cent of the Japanese population. Its unusual success in the tightly regulated Japanese market is due to AFLAC’s recognition that supplemental cancer insurance was largely neglected by Japanese competitors who focused on typical life and health insurance. As such, AFLAC was given the license to sell cancer insurance policies including so-called “Super Cancer” which pays a cash disbursement when cancer is first diagnosed, because selling such policies are not in direct competition with Japanese insurance companies.
As Dorney, a co-founder of Daytimers, succinctly summarizes, the success in the foreign market rests on the company’s ability to recognize and deal with the special characteristics of its chosen market segment. Such ability is particularly important in Japan, because Japan is broken down into fragmented market segments, each with its own distinct distribution culture, tastes, and territories. Considering this, the foreign firm may concentrate efforts on only the most attractive or untapped market segments and later expand distribution. Those efforts, however, may take years to pay off.
Selling under Japanese brand names
Though less inclined towards conspicuous consumption, Japanese consumers tend to display great respect for goods produced by the large corporation which carries famous brand names and good image. Very often, such a corporation happens to be the well-known Japanese firms. Considering the Japanese consumer’s brand loyalty, some Asian firms such as Korean electronic manufacturers and Hong Kong garment makers, sold their products successfully in Japan under the Japanese brand names. Selling under Japanese brand names, however, means that the foreign firm delegates all of their marketing and distribution tasks to the local Japanese distributor. Thus,the foreign firm’s ability to exercise control over how its products are marketed will be greatly restrained. Also, the foreign firm’s chance of gaining a strong foothold in the Japanese market may diminish, since it cannot establish its own consumer brand loyalty.
Emphasizing follow-up services
Although Detroit’s big three automakers are expanding sales of US models in Japan, their market share remains a tiny slice (less than 1 per cent) of the Japanese auto market. One of the main reasons for sluggish sales of US cars in Japan is a lack of effort on the part of US automakers to improve their postsales services. For instance, Inoue, senior managing director of Autorama, pointed out that it often took two to three weeks to receive spare parts for Ford models compared with two to three days required to obtain spare parts for Japanese-made cars. On the other hand, BMW invested $29.7 million to improve their follow-up services including quick part delivery and such an effort may have helped them become the number one import automaker in Japan.
“Piggybacking”
In an effort to circumvent the Japanese distribution maze, some US companies are “piggybacking” with other US ventures which have already established their own distribution channels in Japan. For example, Blue Diamond Almond Growers of California teamed up with Coca-Cola to take advantage of the complementary nature of snack foods and soft drinks, while utilizing Coca-Cola’s well-established distribution routes in Japan. As a result, Blue Diamond has successfully achieved its target goal of 40 per cent of the Japanese market share in ten years. In another example, Shop America aligned with 7-Eleven in Japan to distribute their catalogues to potential Japanese consumers and take orders from them through the well-established 7-Eleven’s distribution network.
As illustrated above, piggybacking is an effective means of circumventing the locked-up distribution channel in Japan. However, it is not without some drawbacks, such as a limited opportunity of piggybacking for noncomplementary product lines, the piggyback rider’s limited direct control over its distribution operations, and the compensation of the piggyback carrier for its distribution services.
Selling directly to non-keiretsu chain stores or “cash-and-carry” wholesalers
Although excluded from carrying many traditional Japanese national brands, the so-called “cash-and-carry” wholesaler has emerged as the major distribution force in the Japanese wholesale sector. They defy norms by bypassing the traditional multilayered distribution channel, and distributing foreign imports at substantially lower prices through discount stores. Since they are not affiliated with the keiretsu network, many foreign firms which are excluded from the distribution keiretsu may channel through the well-recognized “cashand-carry” wholesalers such as Etoile Kaito and Companies. In fact, Stone noted that South Korean TV makers and Taiwanese computer manufacturers utilized these independent wholesalers to market their products to Japanese consumers.
Similarly, non-keiretsu retail giants such as Daiei, Ito-Yokado, and Seiyu, bought $2.05 billion worth of goods directly from neighbouring Asian countries and successfully sold them under their own brand names at discounted prices. Although Japanese consumers are less sensitive to price advantages than are their US counterparts, the aforementioned forms of distribution recently gained popularity from Japanese consumers who have become more price conscious due to ongoing recession in Japan and gradual changes in their lifestyles. Despite numerous merits, the foreign exporter’s heavy reliance on unauthorized Japanese distributors may undermine consumer loyalty to its products, because many Japanese consumers channelled through the unauthorized distributor can be excluded from post-sales warranty services and product recall.
Direct marketing
Some foreign firms such as Daytimers, Amway, and Otto Versand, which were overwhelmed by the Japanese distribution complexity, have developed a variety of direct marketing techniques involving telemarketing, daytime TV shopping, door-to-door selling, in-home party, and mail ordering to reach Japanese consumers directly. Although direct marketing accounted for only 1 per cent of Japanese retail sales in 1987, it shows a sign of promise. According to the Japanese Ministry of Labour, retail sales through direct marketing have doubled from 1983 to 1988[45]. This drastic increase in the volume of direct marketing retail sales may have resulted from the increase of Japanese working women who have less free time to shop. In fact, Dodwell Marketing Consultants reported that over 50 per cent of Japanese working women used mail order at least once a year, while only 30 per cent of working men bought merchandise through mail order. For example, many Japanese women are unwilling to buy their underwear and hosiery at the retail store, because they often feel shame when shopping for those products in public. Therefore such merchandise can be a perfect candidate for mail-order-based direct marketing.
Nonetheless, some direct marketing techniques require fine tuning. For example, telemarketing targeted for Japanese housewives may backfire because they could be easily offended by unsolicited phone calls from strangers. Mail order sales also may create problems, because of unusually high mail cost, lack of a third class rate, and serious difficulty in obtaining direct mail listings in Japan.
Conclusions
In recent years the US policy makers made the Japanese distribution barrier one of the most significant topics at bilateral negotiations with the Japanese government for the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) talks. However, many US firms interested in entering the Japanese market are often unaware of various opportunities for turning what is considered to be a market entry barrier into advantageous incentives aiding entry. Such unawareness is due in large part to the Westerner’s misunderstanding of the Japanese distribution system, which has long evolved from Japanese cultural and historical roots. For instance, Americans tend to perceive the Japanese distribution system as a “closed” and exclusive lockout, whereas the Japanese tend to view their system as one of “close” co-operation crucial for the constant harmony of their society. From Table I, it is evident that the Japanese cultural base is quite different from its US counterpart. Therefore, it is naïve to evaluate the Japanese distribution system from the US perspective only. As Goldman observed, the Japanese distribution system displays high levels of consumer responsiveness, coordination,and equity, while yielding low labour productivity.
Recognizing those differences, it is time for the US companies to re-formulate their distribution/marketing strategies which can adapt to the current Japanese rules and standards. In so doing, the US firms should increase joint interdependency between domestic and foreign firms operating in Japan so that they can encourage a mutual exchange of information which, in turn, facilitates concrete understanding of market competition, distribution dynamics, and consumer needs. Furthermore, the US firms must not only shift their focus from short-term profit/cost saving to long-term gain/stability, but also re-examine their conventional channel alternatives, so that they can create the most streamlined distribution channels that will fit best with their long-termobjectives in the Japanese market.
