孟德斯鸠《论法的精神》读书报告
一、背景及概述
（一）背景
孟德斯鸠所处的时代是17世纪末和18世纪前叶，此时正值法国封建主义和君主专制从发展高峰急剧走向没落的时期，统治阶级以极其残忍的手段压迫广大人民，宫廷和贵族极尽奢侈，民众却在饥寒中挣扎，长期的战乱、苛政使农民起义此起彼伏，政治、经济危机愈演愈烈。工业革命在法国逐渐兴起，工业资产阶级的利益与专制主义的冲突日益尖锐，资产阶级革命的时机进一步成熟。另外，思想领域的革命也为孟德斯鸠理论的形成作好了较为充分的思想准备。英国培根的实验主义，法国笛卡尔的理性主义对他产生着深刻的影响。一大批进步的史学家、科学家、哲学家、作家和进步人士为新兴的资产阶级奔走呼号，他们激烈的抨击封建主义腐朽的社会秩序。英国资产阶级革命的思想也被广泛接受。这都为《论法的精神》的诞生打下了坚实的社会基础。
在资产阶级新兴、封建统治衰落的社会背景和资本主义前期思想革命的学术背景下，孟德斯鸠历时五年考察了欧洲各国的政治和法律制度，并在回国后完成了对后世影响深远的巨著《论法的精神》。
（二）概述
“法的精神”的内涵：法律必须同业已建立或即将建立的政体的性质及原则相关联，无论是政治法还是民法都如此；法律应当与国家的自然状况相联系，与气候、土壤、位置、面积以及农民、猎手或牧民等各种人民的生活方式相关联；法律必须与政体所能承受的自由度相关联，还要和居民的宗教、癖好、财富、人口、贸易、风俗以及礼仪相关联；法律条款之间有内在的联系，它们和各自的渊源、和立法者的宗旨以及奠定法律基础的事物秩序相关联。孟德斯鸠所讨论的法的精神就是上述关系，他得出的结论也是对上述关系的研究结果。
二、作者观点及其论述
孟德斯鸠在《论法的精神》一书中分条讨论了法律与政体、气候、土壤、人口、宗教等的联系，并在最后提出了立法的精神与途径，这也就是“法的精神”主要内容。站在今天的
角度来阅读这一经典著作，书中对后世影响很大的还有贯穿其中的分权理论和自由理论，在此一并列出。
（一）法的精神
1、法律与政体的关系
孟德斯鸠将政体分为三种：共和政体、君主政体、专制政体。共和政体的原则是品德，即对共和国的爱；君主政体的原则是荣誉；专制政体的原则是恐怖。与所在国政体原则相适应，各种政体下的法律有着本质上的不同。共和政体的法律应规定平等与简朴，建立投票权利的法律是基本法律；君主政体应当实行贵族世袭制，由于贵族数目多，需要一个参议会来处理贵族的一切事务。因此，规定参议会的成员、资格、职权的法律就成了该政体的基本法律；而专制政体中所有事物都取决于最高统治者个人的喜怒，故而几乎不需要任何法律。这一部分作者的论述方法主要是引用相关法律条文和前人著作，辅以作者游历考察的所见所闻。
2、法律与气候的关系
孟德斯鸠认为，人的精神特征和内心情感在不同气候中差别极大，所以法律应当与之有所关联。生活在寒冷地区的人，心脏跳动和纤维末端的反应更强烈，分泌更平衡，心脏也更加有力，所以更有活力，更自信、勇敢、坦率；而生活在炎热地区的人，由于纤维的末端变松弛，降低了它们的力量和弹性，便会感到精神萎靡不振，由此便容易产生性格上的软弱、怯懦。在炎热的气候条件下，由于人们容易懒惰，要让人们劳动就必须用强制和惩罚的方法。在这种气候下，专制统治最适合，而且要制定较多的奴役性法律来维护这种统治。在寒冷的气候下，由于人们刚毅、勇敢和活泼、热爱劳动，因此建立共和制最为适合。在这种制度下，法律要制定的少且温和。在这一部分，作者从生理学角度论证了寒冷和炎热气候下人的身体和精神特征，并通过大量举例和对比来说明不同气候下法律的差别。
3、法律与土壤性质的关系
一个国家良好的土地会使人产生依赖，肥沃土地上的乡村居民全身心地投入农事而并不很关注他们的自由，国家是什么政体对他们来说并不重要。所以，专制君主政体更经常地出现在土壤肥沃的国家，而那些土壤不肥沃的国家则为共和政体。
土地贫瘠使人勤劳自制、惯于工作、勇敢而且适合战争，土地肥沃和生活的安逸则使人软弱和贪生怕死。所以在土地肥沃地区，国家需要严格的法律来抑制人们的懒惰，而在土地
贫瘠的地区，国家则需要温和的法律来鼓励人们的积极性。此外，与土壤相关的谋生方式也会引起法律制度的诸多不同，例如从事农耕的民族比以畜牧业为生的民族需要更宽广的法典。作者的论述方式主要是推理、对比和举例。
4、法律同民族精神、风俗习惯的关系
不同地方的人有着不同的民族精神和风俗习惯，他们各自认为的好的法律制度也就因此而不同。孟德斯鸠认为，在不违背整体原则的情况下，立法者应当遵从民族精神。“因为在我们自由地并按照我们天性处理事物时，就是做得最好的时候了”。孟德斯鸠强调，应该用法律去改革由法律所建立的东西，用习惯去改变有习惯所确立的东西。如果用法律去改变应该有习惯去改变的东西，或者相反去做的话，那都是极糟的策略，都可以被视为专制制度。在这一部分，作者着重举了中国礼仪、道德的例子，以阐述法律与民族精神、风俗习惯的关系。
5、法律与人口数量的关系
人口数量关系到一个国家的生产、军事等方面，人口过少则生产力不足，军力弱小，人口过多则容易发生饥荒。故而孟德斯鸠认为国家应当根据自身情况制定鼓励生育或限制生育的法律来控制人口数量，包括婚姻、家庭、弃婴、救济院等等方面，都是法律应当予以规定的。本部分作者主要是举例论证，以希腊和罗马的相关法律和人口状况为例进行阐述，又从当时欧洲情况出发提出建议。
6、法律与宗教的关系
孟德斯鸠认为，因为宗教和法律的首要目的应当是使人们成为好公民，如果其中一方偏离了这一宗旨，那另一方就应更加朝着它而努力，即宗教的束缚越少，法律的约束就应当越多。一个教义对文明国家人民的有利或者有害，更多在于它的滥用与否，而不在于其真伪。这一部分，作者都以具体宗教教义和法律规定为例进行分析论证。
7、法律和它所规定的事物秩序应有的关系
孟德斯鸠认为，人类受各种法律的支配：自然法；神法，即宗教法规；教会法，也称寺院法，是宗教的行政法；国际法；一般政治法；特殊政治；征服法；民法；家法。所以就有不同的法律系统，这就要求分清法律所制定的事物需要和哪个系统的法律发生主要关系。例如，应当以人的法律来制定的事物，就不要由神的法律来制定，应当按照民法原则来处理的事物，就不应按照自然法原则来处理。总之，必须区分各个法律系统的管辖范围，才能使法
律秩序井井有条。这一部分作者分条举例，说明了各个法律系统应当处理各自范围内的事物，以及有交叉的法律系统如何选择的问题。
8、制定法律的途径
孟德斯鸠在《论法的精神》第二十九章说道：“我写这本书的目的仅仅是为了证实它：中庸的精神应该是立法者的精神。”也就是说，法律表面上看起来的样子与其制定时立法者的意图、动机未必一致，看起来相同的法律在不同国家、不同时期的效果也不一样，看似相反的法律有时源于同一精神。所以对两种不同的法律进行比较时不能拿出一条进行对比，而应当把每种法律当成一个整体来综合比较。研究法律时必须将它与制定它的目的、制定时的具体情况联系起来。
孟德斯鸠提出了制定法律的一些注意事项：其一，法律的文体应该简洁明了，不能有歧义或者模糊不清；其二，当法律必须作出一些规定时，应尽量避免以金钱为处罚；其三，法律推理必须从现实到现实，而不是从现实到空想，或者从空想到现实；其四，法律不应当玄奥，因为它是为具有中等理解力的人制定的；其五，没有充足的理由，就不要修订法律；其六，当有人为一项法律给出一个理由时，其理由必须值得制定它；其七，就推定来说，法律的推定比人的推定要好；其八，每条法律都应该有其效力，而不应当因一些私下协议就允许违背它；其九，应特别注意法律如何被构想才不至于违反事物的本性；其十，法律必须具有一定的坦率性和纯洁性。此部分皆为举例说明。
（二）分权理论
孟德斯鸠继洛克之后正式提出了立法、行政、司法三权分立的理论。成为后来西方国家进行政治体制构建的范本，为近代西方政治体制的构建做出了巨大贡献。
孟德斯鸠认为，如果将一个国家的权力集中于某一机关或某一人之手，那么这些权力就会被滥用，公民的自由就会受到侵犯。他反对专制主义，从公民的政治自由出发，提出将国家权力分为立法权、行政权、司法权三部分，将其授予不同的机关。这三种权力既是独立的，又是是相互牵制、相互制衡的。孟德斯鸠指出：“当立法权和行政权集中在一个人或一个机关之手，自由便不复存在了，因为人们将要害怕这个国王或议会制定暴虐的法律，并暴虐地执行这些法律。如果司法权不同立法权和行政权分立，自由也就不存在了。如果司法权同立法权合二为一，则将会对公民的生命和自由施行专断的权力，因为法官就是立法者。如果司法权同行政权合二为一，法官便将握有压迫者的力量。如果同一个人或是由重要人物、贵族或平民组成堵塞同一个机关行使这三种权力，即制定法律权、执行公共决议权和裁判私人犯罪或争讼权，则一切便都完了。”孟德斯鸠还以欧洲和亚洲的某些国家的集权的实例说明集权有弊无利，因此必须实行分权制。
孟德斯鸠把立法权授予议会，行政权赋予君主，而司法权则应由人民选举的法官来独立行使。孟德斯鸠认为，立法权代表国家的一般意志，应由人民集体享有。立法权有两个基本权利，即创制权和反对权。“所谓创制权就是自己制定法律和修改别人制定的法律的权力。而反对权是指取消别人所作决议的权力。”孟德斯鸠认为，国家应由人民通过他们的代表制定法律，并决定具体事务。代表按地区由选民选出。代表机关的任务是制定法律并监督法律的执行。代表机关亦即议会，它由贵族院和平民院组成。孟德斯鸠认为，两院共同拥有立法权，同时他强调贵族院在立法中的作用。他说：“在一个国家里，总是有一些人以出身、财富或荣耀著称；不过，如果他们和平民混合在一起，并且和其他人一样只有一个投票权，公共的自由将成为他们的奴役，而且他们不会有保护这样的自由的任何兴趣，因为大多数的决议将会是和他们作对的。所以，他们参与立法的程度应该和他们在国家中所享有的利益成正比例。”于是他特别强调贵族院在调节国家权力，使立法权和行政权趋于宽和中的作用，而平民在他眼里，只限于选举代表，而不适于讨论事情。他并且主张限制选举权的行使，社会地位过于卑微的人就不应该享有选举权。孟德斯鸠在强调贵族院的作用的同时，主张贵族院的职位应该世袭。同时为了防止世袭权力过分追求私利，他主张在决定征收银钱问题的法案时，只授予贵族院以反对权而没有创制权。
关于行政权，孟德斯鸠认为它是执行国家的意志，应由君主或国王行使。“因为政府的这一部门几乎时时需要急速的行动，所以由一个人管理此比由几个人管理好；反之，属于立法权的事项由许多人处理则比由一个人处理好些。”行政机关根据他所了解的情况决定议会的召集时间和期限，并有权制止立法机关的越权行为。然而，立法权不应对等的钳制行政权，也无权审讯行政者本身及其行为。行政者本身设计神圣不可侵犯的，这对国家防止立法机关趋于专制是非常必要的。同时，行政权通过他的反对权参与立法，但不参与立法事项的讨论，甚至无须提出法案。它对立法机关决定国家税收时，只限于表示同意。军权则由行政机关直接掌握。
孟德斯鸠认为司法权由人民选举的法官行使。法官和被告处于同等的地位。法院不一定是固定的，它们可以视实际情况的需要而定。但是判例应当固定，“以便做到裁判只能是法律条文的准确解释。”也有例外的情况使立法机关享有司法权，例如为了保证显贵的人不受人们的侵害，贵族应该在贵族院受审，而不受普通法院的传讯。贵族院还掌握处理上诉案件的权力，以防司法权过于严峻。而为了保护平民，如果某个公民在公务上侵犯了人民的权利，众议院可以代表人民向贵族院提出控告。
为了保证公民的自由不受侵犯，孟德斯鸠指出，三种权力不仅要分立，而且还要使三种权力相互联系，相互制约，“以权力约束权力。”立法机关不但有权制定法律，还有权监督法律和公共决议的执行。行政权要服从法律，但对立法机关的越权行有权加以制止，并对立法机关通过的某些法律行使否决权。司法机关应该根据法律，独立进行审判，对法律负责。具体讲，各机关的相互制约表现在四个方面：第一，立法机关由贵族院和平民院构成，这两
部分各有其意见和利益，分别活动，互相行使否决权，可见立法机关内部现有互相牵制的关系；第二，行政机关有对立法的否决权，立法机关不能自行集会或闭会，行政机关决定集会和闭会的时间。这是行政机关对立法机关的一种牵制；第三，立法机关对行政机关执行法律的情况进行监督，这是立法机关对行政权的制约。另外，立法机关对行政首脑的违法行为享有弹劾权；第四，司法机关对立法机关的行动是否符合宪法和行政首脑的执法情况有监督权。
（三）自由理论
孟德斯鸠认为，自由有两种，一种是哲学上的自由，即能够行使自己的意志，或者至少相信是在行使自己的意志。一种是政治上的自由。政治上的自由又可分为同政治相关联的自由和同公民相关联的自由。所谓同政治相关联的自由，即是一个人按照自己的愿望以作各种行为的权力，或者说是一个人要有安全感或者至少相信自己有安全感，他说：“一个公民的政治自由是一种心境的平安状态。这种心境的平安是从人人都认为他本身是安全的这个看法产生的。”这种安全感要依靠法律来保障。对同公民相关联的自由的含义，孟德斯鸠未作详细的解释，但他指出这种自由同奴隶制度相抵触。在孟德斯鸠看来，在一个法律的社会里，“自由仅仅是：一个人能够做他应该做的事情，而不被强迫去做他不应该做的事。”“自由是做法律所许可的一切事情的权利；如果一个公民能够做法律所禁止的事情，他就不再有自由了，因为其他的人页同样会有这个权利。”这也就是说：“政治自由并不意味着愿意做什么就做什么。”法律规定让做的事情才能做，法律禁止的事情就不应该去做，大家要遵守法律。只有这样，才能有政治自由，人的安全才有保障。
三、个人评述
孟德斯鸠所著的《论法的精神》是一部集政治与法律于一体的巨著，讨论了法律与政体原则和一国自然人文情况的关系，给出了研究法律和制定法律的指导思想，同时正式提出了影响深远的三权分立理论和法律角度的自由理论，全书论证充分，深入浅出，不仅绘制了当时世界各国政治法律的大致图景，更指导了法律思想的进步。虽然由于时代的限制，有些观点在今天已不适用，但我更多的发现却是很多分析在今天看来依然十分恰当，这才是作者最让我敬佩之处。
距孟德斯鸠完成著作已经200多年，世界各国政治局面已经完全不同，三权分立的思想随时代发展已被世界各国所普遍接受，自由、平等的思想也成为了世界主流思想，这其中孟德斯鸠的贡献可谓功不可没。
孟德斯鸠的法的精神理论是对影响法律的各个方面的深入剖析，虽带有较浓的时代特征和地域性，某些结论在今天世界经济全球化的背景下已不正确，比如法律与气候、土壤关系
部分，但是其中关于法律与民族精神、风俗习惯、人口数量的关系的观点今天看来仍然正确；关于法律与它所规定的事物秩序之间关系的部分，对于区分各法律系统适用范围的理论仍然具有现实的指导意义。我尤其赞赏的是孟德斯鸠提出的制定法律的途径，他所说的研究法律应分析制定的目的和制定时的具体情况，比较法律应以整体来比较，研究法律内部各条文乃至各系统之间联系，都给了我较大的启发，可以作为我今后学习法学的一部分指导思想。而他所说的制定法律的十条（我列出的）注意事项，我认为用于指导今天的立法工作仍然十分恰当。
总而言之，孟德斯鸠的观点虽有时代和环境的局限性，以及思想变革的不彻底性，但其理论中的精华部分（三权分立、法律上的自由、法与内外的联系）仍然熠熠生辉，屹立在法律的殿堂，他对法律思想启蒙所作出的贡献是不可磨灭的。
第二篇：TOLES阅读：论法的精神
The Spirit of Laws
By Charles de Montesquieu
Of Laws in General
1. Of the Relation of Laws to different Beings. Laws, in their most general signification, are the necessary relations arising from the nature of things. In this sense all beings have their laws: the Deity1 His laws, the material world its laws, the intelligences superior to man their laws, the beasts their laws, man his laws.
They who assert that a blind fatality produced the various effects we behold in this world talk very absurdly; for can anything be more unreasonable than to pretend that a blind fatality could be productive of intelligent beings?
There is, then, a prime reason; and laws are the relations subsisting between it and different beings, and the relations of these to one another.
God is related to the universe, as Creator and Preserver; the laws by which He created all things are those by which He preserves them. He acts according to these rules, because He knows them; He knows them, because He made them; and He made them, because they are in relation to His wisdom and power.
Since we observe that the world, though formed by the motion of matter, and void of understanding, subsists through so long a succession of ages, its motions must certainly be directed by invariable laws; and could we imagine another world, it must also have constant rules, or it would inevitably perish.
Thus the creation, which seems an arbitrary act, supposes laws as invariable as those of the fatality of the Atheists. It would be absurd to say that the Creator might govern the world without those rules, since without them it could not subsist.
These rules are a fixed and invariable relation. In bodies moved, the motion is received, increased, diminished, or lost, according to the relations of the quantity of matter and velocity; each diversity is uniformity, each change is constancy.
Particular intelligent beings may have laws of their own making, but they have some likewise which they never made. Before there were intelligent beings, they were possible; they had therefore possible relations, and consequently possible laws. Before laws were made, there were relations of possible justice. To say that there is nothing just or unjust but what is commanded or forbidden by positive laws, is the same as saying that before the describing of a circle all the radii were not equal.
We must therefore acknowledge relations of justice antecedent to the positive law by which they are established: as, for instance, if human societies existed, it would be right to conform to their laws; if there were intelligent beings that had received a benefit of another being, they ought to show their gratitude; if one intelligent being had created another intelligent being, the latter ought to continue in its original state of dependence; if one intelligent being injures another, it deserves a retaliation; and so on.
But the intelligent world is far from being so well governed as the physical. For though the former has also its laws, which of their own nature are invariable, it does not conform to them so exactly as the physical world. This is because, on the one hand, particular intelligent beings are of a finite nature, and consequently liable to error; and on the other, their nature requires them to be free agents. Hence they do not steadily conform to their primitive laws; and even those of their own instituting they frequently infringe.
Whether brutes be governed by the general laws of motion, or by a particular movement, we cannot determine. Be that as it may, they have not a more intimate relation to God than the rest of the material world; and sensation is of no other use to them than in the relation they have either to other particular beings or to themselves.
By the allurement of pleasure they preserve the individual, and by the same allurement they preserve their species. They have natural laws, because they are united by sensation; positive laws they have none, because they are not connected by knowledge. And yet they do not invariably conform to their natural laws; these are better observed by vegetables, that have neither understanding nor sense.
Brutes are deprived of the high advantages which we have; but they have some which we have not. They have not our hopes, but they are without our fears; they are subject like us to death, but without knowing it; even most of them are more attentive than we to self-preservation, and do not make so bad a use of their passions.
Man, as a physical being, is like other bodies governed by invariable laws. As an intelligent being, he incessantly transgresses the laws established by God, and changes those of his own instituting. He is left to his private direction, though a limited being, and subject, like all finite intelligences, to ignorance and error: even his imperfect knowledge he loses; and as a sensible creature, he is hurried away by a thousand impetuous passions. Such a being might every instant forget his Creator; God has therefore reminded him of his duty by the laws of religion. Such a being is liable every moment to forget himself; philosophy has provided against this by the laws of morality. Formed to live in society, he might forget his fellow-creatures; legislators have therefore by political and civil laws confined him to his duty.
2. Of the Laws of Nature. Antecedent to the above-mentioned laws are those of nature, so called, because they derive their force entirely from our frame and existence. In order to have a perfect knowledge of these laws, we must consider man before the establishment of society: the laws received in such a state would be those of nature.
The law which, impressing on our minds the idea of a Creator, inclines us towards Him, is the first in importance, though not in order, of natural laws. Man in a state of nature would have the faculty of knowing, before he had acquired any
knowledge. Plain it is that his first ideas would not be of a speculative nature; he would think of the preservation of his being, before he would investigate its origin. Such a man would feel nothing in himself at first but impotency and weakness; his fears and apprehensions would be excessive; as appears from instances (were there any necessity of proving it) of savages found in forests,2 trembling at the motion of a leaf, and flying from every shadow.
In this state every man, instead of being sensible of his equality, would fancy himself inferior. There would therefore be no danger of their attacking one another; peace would be the first law of nature.
The natural impulse or desire which Hobbes attributes to mankind of subduing one another is far from being well founded. The idea of empire and dominion is so complex, and depends on so many other notions, that it could never be the first which occurred to the human understanding.
Hobbes3 inquires, "For what reason go men armed, and have locks and keys to fasten their doors, if they be not naturally in a state of war?" But is it not obvious that he attributes to mankind before the establishment of society what can happen but in consequence of this establishment, which furnishes them with motives for hostile attacks and self-defence?
Next to a sense of his weakness man would soon find that of his wants. Hence another law of nature would prompt him to seek for nourishment.
Fear, I have observed, would induce men to shun one another; but the marks of this fear being reciprocal, would soon engage them to associate. Besides, this association would quickly follow from. the very pleasure one animal feels at the approach of another of the same species. Again, the attraction arising from the difference of sexes would enhance this pleasure, and the natural inclination they have for each other would form a third law.
Beside the sense or instinct which man possesses in common with brutes, he has the advantage of acquired knowledge; and thence arises a second tie, which brutes have not. Mankind have therefore a new motive of uniting; and a fourth law of nature results from the desire of living in society.
3. Of Positive Laws. As soon as man enters into a state of society he loses the sense of his weakness; equality ceases, and then commences the state of war.
Each particular society begins to feel its strength, whence arises a state of war between different nations. The individuals likewise of each society become sensible of their force; hence the principal advantages of this society they endeavour to convert to their own emolument, which constitutes a state of war between individuals.
These two different kinds of states give rise to human laws. Considered as inhabitants of so great a planet, which necessarily contains a variety of nations, they have laws relating to their mutual intercourse, which is what we call the law of nations. As members of a society that must be properly supported, they have laws relating to the governors and the governed, and this we distinguish by the name of politic law. They have also another sort of law, as they stand in relation to each other; by which is understood the civil law.
The law of nations is naturally founded on this principle, that different nations ought in time of peace to do one another all the good they can, and in time of war as little injury as possible, without prejudicing their real interests.
The object of war is victory; that of victory is conquest; and that of conquest preservation. From this and the preceding principle all those rules are derived which constitute the law of nations.
All countries have a law of nations, not excepting the Iroquois themselves, though they devour their prisoners: for they send and receive ambassadors, and understand the rights of war and peace. The mischief is that their law of nations is not
founded on true principles.
Besides the law of nations relating to all societies, there is a polity or civil constitution for each particularly considered. No society can subsist without a form of government. "The united strength of individuals," as Gravina4 well observes, "constitutes what we call the body politic."
The general strength may be in the hands of a single person, or of many. Some think that nature having established paternal authority, the most natural government was that of a single person. But the example of paternal authority proves nothing. For if the power of a father relates to a single government, that of brothers after the death of a father, and that of cousins-german after the decease of brothers, refer to a government of many. The political power necessarily comprehends the union of several families.
Better is it to say, that the government most conformable to nature is that which best agrees with the humour and disposition of the people in whose favour it is established.
The strength of individuals cannot be united without a conjunction of all their wills. "The conjunction of those wills," as Gravina again very justly observes, "is what we call the civil state."
Law in general is human reason, inasmuch as it governs all the inhabitants of the earth: the political and civil laws of each nation ought to be only the particular cases in which human reason is applied.
They should be adapted in such a manner to the people for whom they are framed that it should be a great chance if those of one nation suit another.
They should be in relation to the nature and principle of each government; whether they form it, as may be said of politic laws; or whether they support it, as in
the case of civil institutions.
They should be in relation to the climate of each country, to the quality of its soil, to its situation and extent, to the principal occupation of the natives, whether husbandmen, huntsmen, or shepherds: they should have relation to the degree of liberty which the constitution will bear; to the religion of the inhabitants, to their inclinations, riches, numbers, commerce, manners, and customs. In fine, they have relations to each other, as also to their origin, to the intent of the legislator, and to the order of things on which they are established; in all of which different lights they ought to be considered.
This is what I have undertaken to perform in the following work. These relations I shall examine, since all these together constitute what I call the Spirit of Laws.
I have not separated the political from the civil institutions, as I do not pretend to treat of laws, but of their spirit; and as this spirit consists in the various relations which the laws may bear to different objects, it is not so much my business to follow the natural order of laws as that of these relations and objects.
I shall first examine the relations which laws bear to the nature and principle of each government; and as this principle has a strong influence on laws, I shall make it my study to understand it thoroughly: and if I can but once establish it, the laws will soon appear to flow thence as from their source. I shall proceed afterwards to other and more particular relations.
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1. "Law," says Plutarch, "is the king of mortal and immortal beings." See his treatise, A Discourse to an Unlearned Prince.
2. Witness the savage found in the forests of Hanover, who was carried over to
England during the reign of George I.
3. In pref., De cive.
4. Italian poet and jurist, 1664-1718.
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