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时间:2024.3.20

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原文:

A More Complete Conceptual Framework for SME Finance

Allen N. Berger Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Gregory F. Udell Kelley School of Business, Indiana University,

1. Financial institution structure and lending to SMEs

The research literature provides a considerable amount of evidence on the effects of financial institution structure on SME lending, although as noted above, the findings rarely go beyond the distinction between transactions lending technologies versus relationship lending to parse among the very different transactions technologies. Here, we briefly review the findings with regard to the comparative advantages of large versus small institutions (subsection A), foreign-owned versus domestically-owned institutions (subsection B), state-owned versus privately-owned institutions (subsection C) and market concentration (subsection D).

A. Large versus small institutions

There are a number of reasons why large institutions may have comparative advantages in employing transactions lending technologies which are based on hard information and small institutions may have comparative advantages in using the relationship lending technology which is based on soft information. Large institutions may be able to take advantage of economies of scale in the processing of hard information, but be relatively poor at processing soft information because it is difficult to quantify and transmit through the communication channels of large organizations (e.g., Stein 2002). Under relationship lending, there may be agency problems created within the financial institution because the loan officer that has direct contact over time with the SME is the repository of soft information that cannot be easily communicated to the management or owners of the financial institution. This may give comparative advantages in relationship lending to small institutions

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with lower agency costs within the institution because they typically have less separation (if any) between ownership and management and fewer overall layers of management (e.g., Berger and Udell 2002). Finally, it is often argued that large institutions are relatively disadvantaged at relationship lending to SMEs because of organizational diseconomies with also providing transactions loans and other wholesale services to large corporate customers (e.g., Williamson 1967, 1988).

The empirical literature on this topic usually does not observe the lending technologies used by large and small institutions, but rather draws conclusions about these technologies from the characteristics of the SME borrowers and contract terms on credits issued to these SMEs by institutions of different sizes. In most cases, the research is based on data from U.S. banks and SMEs. Large institutions are found to lend to larger, older, more financially secure SMEs (e.g., Haynes, Ou, and Berney 1999). It is often argued that these findings are consistent with large institutions lending to relatively transparent and relatively safe borrowers that are more likely to receive transactions credits. Large institutions are also found to charge lower interest rates and earn lower yields on SME loan contracts (e.g., Berger, Rosen, and Udell 2003, Berger 2004, Carter, McNulty, and Verbrugge 2004). It is contended that these results may reflect that large institutions lend to safer borrowers and/or employ lending technologies with lower operating costs, which are more likely to be transactions loans. In addition, large institutions are found to have temporally shorter, less exclusive, more impersonal, and longer distance relationships with their SME loan customers (e.g., Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein forthcoming). These findings are argued to suggest weaker relationships with borrowers for large institutions, which are indicative of transactions loans. Finally, large institutions appear to base their SME credit decisions more on strong financial ratios than on prior relationships (e.g., Cole, Goldberg, and White 2004, Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein forthcoming). It is argued that both the dependence on strong financial ratios and the non-dependence on prior relationships for large institutions are indicative of the use of transactions lending technologies.

We argue that these findings are not as clear-cut in their support of the 2

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comparative advantages by institution size as they might at first seem. For the most part, prior authors appear to treat transactions lending technologies as a collective whole that may be adequately represented by just one of these technologies, financial statement lending. This is not necessarily the case. We agree that the findings that SME credits by large institutions tend to be associated with weaker lending relationships and less often based on prior relationships and are indeed consistent with the predicted comparative disadvantage of large institutions in relationship lending. However, we do not agree with the contentions in the prior literature that greater SME transparency, safer SME borrowers, lower rates and yields, and possible lower operating costs and greater reliance on financial ratios for large institutions provide strong support for the hypothesis that these institutions have comparative advantages in transactions lending technologies. Although greater transparency, safer borrowers, lower rates, lower operating costs, and greater reliance on financial ratios are indicative of the use of the financial statement lending technology, they are not necessarily indicative of the types of loans or borrowers associated with the other transactions lending technologies. That is, these other transactions technologies may not necessarily be used to lend to SMEs that are less opaque or safer than relationship borrowers, may not have lower rates or smaller processing costs than relationship loans, and may not be based on stronger financial ratios than the relationship lending technology.

To illustrate, note that two of the transactions lending technologies that are often used by large U.S. banks are not consistent with these characteristics. As indicated above, small business credit scoring appears to be employed by large U.S. banks to lend to SMEs that are relatively opaque and risky, and these loans have relatively high interest rates. As discussed further below, this technology is based largely on the personal credit of the SME owner, rather than on strong financial ratios of the firm. Similarly, as discussed below, the asset-based lending technology employed by many large banks is generally used to lend to relatively opaque and risky borrowers at relatively high interest rates. These loans typically involve relatively high processing costs of monitoring the accounts receivable and inventory pledged as collateral and the primary information is based on the value of the collateral, rather than strong

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financial ratios of the borrower.

Moreover, even to the extent that large institutions may be disadvantaged in relationship lending and tend to lend to more transparent SME borrowers on average than small institutions, this does not necessarily imply that a sizeable presence of small institutions is necessary for significant credit availability for opaque SMEs. A limited amount of additional research finds that the local market shares of large and small U.S. banks have relatively little association with SME credit availability in their markets (Jayaratne and Wolken 1999, Berger, Rosen, and Udell 2003).

One potential hypothesis that may help explain this finding is that large U.S. banks are able to accommodate many opaque SME loan customers with transactions technologies other than financial statement lending, such as small business credit scoring and asset-based lending. That is, large institutions may have more transparent SME borrowers on average than small institutions because they have more financial statement loans to transparent SMEs than small institutions, but these large institutions may also be able to make credit available to significant numbers of opaque SMEs using the other transactions technologies. This hypothesis is difficult to test because the lending technology is usually unobserved.

A second hypothesis may also help explain the finding of little association between the market shares of large and small institutions and SME credit availability. Large institutions may be disadvantaged at serving a significant subset of opaque SMEs, but market forces may be efficient in sorting these opaque SMEs to small institutions in the market that serve these borrowers using the relationship lending technology. The empirical evidence on the effects of U.S. bank mergers and acquisitions (M&As) on SME lending provides some support for this second hypothesis, although the lending technologies and the opacity of the borrowers is typically not observed in these studies. The studies find that large institutions reduce their SME lending after M&As, but that other banks in the same local markets appear to respond by increasing their own supplies of SME credit substantially (e.g., Berger, Saunders, Scalise, and Udell 1998, Berger, Goldberg, and White 2001, Avery 4

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and Samolyk 2004). As well, new small banks are often created in these markets that provide additional boosts to the local supply of SME credit (Berger, Bonime, Goldberg, and White 2004).

The finding that the availability of credit to SMEs does not appear to depend in an important way on the market presence of large versus small institutions in the U.S. does not necessarily apply to other nations because of other differences in the financial institution structures of these nations or lending infrastructures in these nations that limit competition for SME credits. In an international comparison, greater market shares for small banks are found to be associated with higher SME employment, as well as more overall bank lending (Berger, Hasan, and Klapper 2004). These findings hold for both developed and developing nations, hold with controls included for some other aspects of the financial institution structure (e.g., shares of foreign-owned and state-owned banks, bank concentration), and hold with controls for some aspects of the lending infrastructure (e.g., regulation, legal system).

B. Foreign-owned versus domestically-owned institutions

For a number of reasons, foreign-owned institutions may have comparative advantages in transactions lending and domestically-owned institutions may have comparative advantages in relationship lending. Foreign-owned institutions are typically part of large organizations, and so all of the logic discussed above regarding large institutions generally applies to foreign-owned institutions as well. Foreign-owned institutions may also face additional hurdles in relationship lending because they may have particular difficulties in processing and transmitting soft information over greater distances, through more managerial layers, and having to cope with multiple economic, cultural, language, and regulatory environments (e.g., Buch 2003). Moreover, in developing nations, foreign-owned institutions headquartered in developed nations may have additional advantages in transactions lending to some SMEs because of access to better information technologies for collecting and assessing hard information. For example, some foreign-owned institutions use a form of small business credit scoring to lend to SMEs in developing nations based on the SME’s industry. Other institutions provide home-nation training for loan officers stationed in developing nations (Berger,

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Hasan, and Klapper 2004).

There is very little empirical evidence on SME lending by foreign-owned institutions in developed nations, although some research finds that these institutions tend to have a wholesale orientation (e.g., DeYoung and Nolle 1996), and in some cases tend to specialize in serving multinational corporations headquartered in their home nation, presumably using transactions technologies applied to hard information (e.g., Goldberg and Saunders 1981). Some evidence also is consistent with the hypothesis that foreign-owned institutions may have difficulty processing local soft information needed to provide cash management services, although this finding is based on data from multinational corporations (e.g., Berger, Dai, Ongena, and Smith 2003). In most cases, the research on bank efficiency in developed nations suggests that the disadvantages of foreign ownership outweigh the disadvantages on average, although it is not known how much of this is attributable to the lending function (e.g., DeYoung and Nolle 1996, Berger, DeYoung, Genay, and Udell 2000).

The empirical findings regarding foreign-owned institutions in developing nations are quite different. Foreign-owned banks usually appear to be more profitable and efficient than domestically-owned banks on average in these nations (e.g., Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt, and Huizinga 2001, Martinez Peria and Mody 2004), although one study finds roughly equal performance after controlling for a number of different types of governance and governance change (Berger, Clarke, Cull, Klapper, and Udell forthcoming). The better performance of foreign-owned banks in developing nations relative to developed nations may be due to the better technology access noted above, or some combination of better access to capital markets, superior ability to diversify risks, or greater managerial experience. There is also evidence on the effects of foreign-owned institutions on SME credit availability in developing nations. In most of the studies, foreign-owned banks individually or larger shares for these banks are associated with greater credit availability for SMEs (e.g., Dages, Goldberg, and Kinney 2000, Clarke, Cull, and Martinez Peria 2002, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic 2004, Berger, Hasan, and Klapper 2004, Clarke, Cull, Martinez Peria, and Sanchez 6

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forthcoming), although one study finds that foreign-owned banks may have difficulty in supplying SME credit (e.g., Berger, Klapper, and Udell 2001). As above for the U.S. data, the lending technologies are generally unobserved, and there is even less information available about the characteristics of the SME borrowers or contract terms from which to infer these technologies. Although the foreign-owned institutions almost surely use transactions technologies, it is usually not known which among the technologies is employed or the opacity of the borrowers served.

C. State-owned versus privately-owned institutions

State-owned institutions may be expected to have comparative advantages in transactions lending and privately-owned institutions may be expected to have comparative advantages in relationship lending simply because state-owned institutions are typically larger. There are also a number of additional arguments with regard to the general ability of state-owned institutions to affect the supply of funds available to creditworthy SMEs through any lending technology. State-owned institutions generally operate with government subsidies and often have mandates to supply additional credit to SMEs or entrepreneurs in general, or to those in specific industries, sectors, or regions. Although in principle, this might be expected to improve funding of creditworthy SMEs, it could have the opposite effect in practice because these institutions may be inefficient due to a lack of market discipline. Much of their funding to SMEs may be to firms that are not creditworthy because of this inefficiency. The credit recipients may also not be creditworthy because the lending mandates do not necessarily require the funding be applied to positive net present value projects, or that the loans be expected to be repaid at market rates. As well some of the funds may be channeled for political purposes, rather than for economically creditworthy ends (e.g., Sapienza forthcoming). State-owned institutions may also provide relatively weak monitoring of borrowers and/or refrain from aggressive collection procedures as part of their mandates to subsidize chosen borrowers or because of the lack of market discipline. In nations with substantial state-owned banking sectors, there may also be significant spillover effects that discourage privately-owned institutions from SME lending due to “crowding out” effects of subsidized loans from state-owned institutions or poor credit cultures that are perpetuated

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by the state-owned presence.

The empirical findings – which are generally either cross-section studies of many nations or focused on one or a few developing nations – are generally consistent with the negative performance effects of state ownership. Studies of general performance typically find that individual state-owned banks are relatively inefficient and that large shares of state bank ownership are typically associated with unfavorable macroeconomic consequences (e.g., Clarke and Cull 2002, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2002, Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2004, Berger, Hasan, and Klapper 2004, Berger, Clarke, Cull, Klapper, and Udell forthcoming). The evidence also generally suggests that less SME credit is available in nations with large market shares for state-owned banks (e.g., Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic 2004, Berger, Hasan, and Klapper 2004). As well, nonperforming loan rates at state-owned banks tend to be very high, consistent with lending to SMEs with negative net present value loans, weak monitoring of loan customers, and/or lack of aggressive collection procedures (e.g., Hanson 2004, Berger, Clarke, Cull, Klapper, and Udell forthcoming). Consistent with these findings of generally negative consequences of state ownership, studies of the effects of bank privatization in both developed nations (e.g., Verbrugge, Megginson, and Owens 2000, Otchere and Chan 2003) and developing nations (e.g., Clarke, Cull, and Megginson forthcoming) typically find improvements in performance following the elimination of state ownership. Similar to the case for foreign-owned institutions, state-owned institutions likely generally use transactions technologies, but there is little information available on the technologies employed or data from which to infer these technologies.

D. Market concentration

Greater market concentration of financial institutions may either reduce or increase the supply of credit available to creditworthy SMEs. Under the traditional structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis, greater concentration results in reduced credit access through any lending technology. This may occur in several ways as institutions in more concentrated markets may exercise greater market power. These institutions may choose to raise profits through higher interest rates or fees on loans to SMEs; they may 8

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choose to reduce risk or supervisory burden by tightening credit standards for SMEs; and/or they may choose to be less aggressive in finding or serving creditworthy SMEs, taking advantage of a “quiet life” afforded to managers by the market power. Alternatively, institutions in more concentrated markets may increase SME access to credit using one of the lending technologies, relationship lending. Greater concentration may encourage institutions to invest in lending relationships because the SMEs are less likely to find alternative sources of credit in the future. Market power helps the institution enforce a long-term implicit contract in which the borrower receives a subsidized interest rate in the short term, and then compensates the institution by paying a higher-than-competitive rate in a later period (Sharpe 1990, Petersen and Rajan 1995).

Although both theories may apply simultaneously, empirical studies have not come to consensus as to which of these may dominate empirically and whether the net supply of SME credit is lower or higher in concentrated markets. Some studies of the SCP hypothesis using U.S. data found that higher concentration is associated with higher SME loan interest rates (e.g., Hannan 1991, Berger, Rosen, and Udell 2003). Although this finding may appear to support the SCP hypothesis, it may also be consistent with the alternative hypothesis of an expansion of relationship lending if relationship loans tend to have higher interest rates on average than transactions loans. Relationship loans do not necessarily have higher average rates, as argued above, but we cannot rule out this possibility. As above for the empirical literatures on large versus small, foreign-owned versus domestically-owned, and state-owned versus privately-owned institutions, much of the difficulty in interpreting the effects of market concentration arises because the lending technologies are generally unobserved.

A number of recent studies have looked instead to testing these hypotheses by examining the effects of banking market concentration and other indicators of market power such as regulatory restrictions on competition (part of the lending infrastructure discussed further below) on SMEs and general economic performance. The empirical results are mixed. Some of the studies find unfavorable effects from high banking market concentration and

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restrictions on competition (e.g., Jayaratne and Strahan 1998, Black and Strahan 2002, Berger, Hasan, and Klapper 2004), others find favorable effects of bank concentration (e.g., Petersen and Rajan 1995, Cetorelli and Gambera 2001, Zarutskie 2003, Cetorelli 2004, Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia forthcoming), and still others find the effects may differ with the lending infrastructure or economic environment (e.g., DeYoung, Goldberg, and White 1999, Beck, Demirgü?-Kunt, and Maksimovic 2004)

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FROM: Prepared for presentation at the World Bank Conference on Small and Medium Enterprises: Overcoming Growth Constraints

World Bank, MC 13-121

October 14-15, 2004

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译文:

一个更加完整概念框架的中小企业融资

Allen N. Berger 美国联邦储备局

Gregory F. Udell 印地安那大学商学院

1.金融机构对中小企业贷款和结构

这个研究提供了大量的影响金融机构对中小企业贷款质量的证据,如上文提到的,结果几乎超越两者之间的区别与关系型贷款借给技术交易中非常不同的解析交易技术。在这里,我们简要评述了这项发现对于比较优势的大与小机构(A),外资对国有机构(B)、国有和分段私营机构(C)和市场集中度(D)。

A.大型机构与小型的比较

有很多原因,大型机构可能在业务借贷的技术和巨大数量的信息方面有优势,小机构的使用关系型贷款技术在软件信息上面有优势。大型机构可以利用规模经济的过程中获得的信息,但其相对薄弱,因为它在处理软信息时很难用数量和通过沟通渠道传递(例如,斯坦2002)。在关系型贷款中,可能存在的代理问题在于金融机构,因为贷款职员有直接联系我国中小企业在过去一段时间的软信息仓库,不能轻易传达给管理或业主的金融机构。这可能会比较优势在关系型贷款机构,以降低的代理成本很小,因为他们通常在机构有较少的分离(如果有的话)之间的所有权和管理以及更少的总体层次的管理(例如,柏格与Udell 20xx年)。最后,它通常辩称,大型机构相对弱势在关系型贷款的中小型企业组织与规模不经济相对因与交易也提供贷款和其他批发服务(例如,大公司的客户,1988)。

19xx年,威廉姆森关于这个主题的实证文献通常不遵守借贷技术使用大的和小的机构,而是这些技术的特点和我国中小企业信用借款者与合同条款,这些中小企业在境外机构签发的大小不同。在大多数情况下,通过研究基于数据来自美国银行和中小型企业发现,他们更愿意贷款给大型机构,而不是经济保障中小企业(如海恩斯、欧、Berney 19xx年)。通常认为,这样的结果是一致的大型机构借贷,以相对透明且相对安全的借款人更容易接受交易额度。大型机构更喜欢低收益率和SME贷款(例

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如,20xx年,Udell、2004伯杰·卡特、20xx年,Verbrugge)。

这些结果可能反映了大型机构借钱给他的安全贷款借款人,或雇用技术和降低操作成本、更有可能被交易的贷款。此外,大机构都发现有时间短,更少的专业性,更客观、更长距离的关系和他们的中小企业贷款客户(例如,柏格·米勒·彼德生、拉詹·斯坦)。这些研究发现,建议较弱的关系,这为大型机构的借款人的贷款是提示性的交易。最后,大型机构似乎更注重,他们强大的信用财务比率(例如,乔科尔·戈德堡·怀特20xx年、米勒·伯杰·斯坦拉詹,2003)。有人争辩说,双方依靠强大的财务比率和非独立的大型机构,在之前的关系上对具有象征意义的使用贷款技术进行了研究。

我们认为这些结果并不明确的支持比较优势,因为单位大小并不统

一。最重要的是,对交易之前出现的贷款技术作为一种整体来充分代表这些技术、财务报表贷款,这是不必要的。我们同意这项发现,中小企业信用制度往往是由大量的相关关系,与较弱的借贷关系的基础上减少的,的确是符合预测比较劣势的大型机构在关系型贷款。然而,我们不同意这个争斗性的文献。更透明、更安全的中小企业的信用借款者,拥有较低的利率和产量,并可能降低运营成本和更多依靠财务比率为大型机构提供有力的支持,这些机构的假设有比较优势的借贷业务技术。尽管有更高的透明度、更安全的借贷者、较低操作成本、较低的利率、更大的依赖性、但财务比率是提示性的财务报表借贷技术,他们并不一定表明真正类型的贷款或借款人的贷款和其他交易的相关技术。因此,这些其他的交易技术不一定是用来借钱给中小企业不透明或安全比关系,也可能是没有借款人或较小的处理费用低利率贷款比关系,并不一定要基于强大财务比率比关系型贷款的技术。

例如,两个交易的借贷技术,经常被借贷的美国银行也不符合这些特性。正如上文所说,小企业信用评分似乎受雇于美国银行贷款给中小企业,是比较不透明的、危险的,这些贷款的利率相对较高。为进一步的讨论,该技术是以下主要基于个人信用的中小企业所有者,而不是在强大的公司财务比率。同样,为下面讨论,以资产为基础的贷款所雇用的许多大型银行技术通常用于借给相对不透明的和危险的借款人在相对较高的利率。这些贷款通常涉及到相对较高的加工成本,和监控应收账款和存货质押作为抵押。主要信息是基于抵押品的价值,而不是强大的借款人财务比率。

而且,即使在某种程度上,大型机构可能处于弱势地位的关系中。银行往往将钱借给贷款借款人更透明的中小企业平均比小的机构,但这并12

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不意味着相当大的小机构存在显著的信贷资金是必要的。限定的额外的研究发现,当地的市场份额大的企业和小的美国银行,与中小企业信用相对小的协会在本国市场更具有有效性Wolken 1999,(Jayaratne罗森博格,20xx年,Udell)。

一个潜在的假设可能有助于解释这一发现是,美国银行都可以容纳很多不透明的中小企业贷款客户提供交易技术比其他财务报表借贷,如小型商业信用评分法和以资产为基础的贷款。那就是说,与小型机构相比,大型机构可能会有更多的透明SME借款人,因为他们有更多的财务报表。虽然中小企业贷款比较透明,但这些大型机构也可以大量使用其他交易的不透明的中小企业的技术。这个假设通常是困难的,因为借贷的测试技术是很难实现的。

第二个假设也可以帮助解释结果之间的关系不大,市场份额大的和小的机构和中小企业信用有效性。大型机构可能处于弱势地位的重要的原因是,以更好地为中小企业,虽不透明,但市场力量可以有效的分类这些不透明的中小企业在市场上小机构之间的关系,为这些贷款的借款人利用技术。实证结果美国银行并购中小企业贷款上提供一些支持这第二次的假说,虽然贷款技术和混浊的借贷者通常是无法观察在这些研究中。研究发现,大型机构降低中小企业贷款后,其他银行之间存在,但在同一个地方市场反应增加自己的供应的(例如,Scalise、伯杰19xx年,Udel、伯杰、戈德堡·怀特·约翰逊、Samolyk 20xx年)。新的小银行一样,常常在这些市场,提供额外增加到当地的供应(伯杰,戈德堡·怀特, 20xx年)。

这一发现对中小企业信用的有效性似乎并不依赖于市场上的一种重要方式存在。大型与小型机构在美国并不适用于其他国家由于其他的金融机构结构上的差异,这些国家或借贷的基础设施,在这些国家对中小企业信用限制竞争。在全球中比较,更大的市场份额是为增加小银行与中小企业就业,以及更全面的银行贷款(中译本)。这些发现为发达国家和发展中国家,包括一些与控制等方面的金融机构的结构(如股票的外资和国有银行,银行集中),并与控制等方面的一些借贷基础设施(如调控、法律制度)。

B.外资企业和国内企业

因为种种原因,外资机构可能在交易上有比较优势,国内企业的借贷机构在关系型贷款方面可能有比较优势。外资机构通常不是有一部分构成,所以,所有的大型组织的逻辑上面讨论关于大型机构普遍适用于外国机构。外资机构也会面对障碍,因为他们在关系型贷款有特殊的处理和

13

西安交通大学城市学院本科生毕业设计(论文)

传输距离,软信息通过更多的管理层次,不得不被多个经济、文化、语言、监管环境所处理。而且,在发展中国家,外资机构总部在发达国家中可能有额外的优势,因为一些中小企业贷款交易中获得更好的信息技术和更加方便的信息收集。例如, 在发展中国家的工业中小企业的基础上,一些外国机构使用一种形式的小企业信用评分,然后贷款给中小企业。其他机构提供贷款给由本国培训人员驻扎的发展中国家。

很少有对发达国家中小企业贷款外资机构的实证研究。虽然有些研究发现,这些机构倾向于拥有大规模定位(例如,DeYoung和产品1996),在某些情况下,往往专门为跨国公司,总部设在家里的国家,大概是利用交易技术应用于硬信息(例如:戈德堡和桑德斯1981)。有些证据也是符合这个假设的。尽管这一发现是基于数据来自跨国公司,但外国机构可能在一些方面遇到困难,如需要处理当地软信息提供现金管理服务等(例如,柏格、Ongena史密斯,20xx年)。在大多数情况下,银行的效率研究表明,在发达国家的外国所有权的劣势大于平均水平,尽管没人知道这当中有多少是由于贷款功能引起的(例如,DeYoung和产品质量,19xx年,DeYoung伯杰、Genay、Udell 2000)。

实证结果发现,对于拥有外国人的单位,在发展中国家有很大的不同。外资银行通常比国有企业银行在这些国家显得更有利可图(例如,Claessens、Demirguc-Kunt,2001,马丁内兹、Peria、惠钦格,2004)。但一个研究发现,有一个大致相同的现象,在控制有很多不同类型的治理和变化(中译本,Klapper克拉克,Udell)。外资银行的更好的性能,在发展中国家相对于发达国家的,可能由于技术层面上提到的,最好还是较好地使用的资本市场,以及优越的能力和更大的多元化风险管理经验。也有证据表明在发展中国家,外资机构对中小企业信用有效性的影响。在大部分的研究中,外资银行可以单独拥有或更大的份额,为这些银行信贷资金大中小型企业(例如,Dages,戈德堡,Kinney 2000,克拉克,马丁内兹Peria20xx年,Demirguc-Kunt·贝克,20xx年,Klapper伯杰,哈桑·克拉克,20xx年,马丁内兹Peria摘)。在对外资银行的研究中发现,我国中小企业信用供应方面有困难,(例如,Klapper伯杰,Udell 20xx年)。如上述资料显示,美国的借贷技术通常通过对拥有较少的信息特征,或合同条款的中小企业借款者来推断这些技术。尽管外国机构几乎肯定交易技术,它通常是不为人所知的技术的使用或混浊的借贷者。

C.私营机构和国有机构

私营机构的贷款和私人机构将会在交易上有比较优势,而国有机构14

原文与译文-

将会有比较优势在关系型贷款上,仅仅因为国有机构一般规模较大。也有一些额外的争论,是关于国有机构的总体能力的影响,以及提供经费和对中小企业信用贷款技术。国有机构和政府补贴的一般操作,经常采用中小企业提供的额外信用,或者是企业家或在特定行业或地区内。尽管原则上,这可能会提高中小企业信用的资助,但它可能会产生相反的作用,因为这些机构在实践中可能缺乏效率市场规律。大部分对中小企业信用企业的资金,不是因为这个效率低下。信贷可能还不是因为借贷信用,其次也不一定需要资金被用于积极的净现值的项目,或在市场利率的贷款项目。也有些基金可能会有一些政治目的,而不是经济上的。国有机构也可以提供相对薄弱的监测借款人,或使用和平的采集程序作为强制补助选择借贷者或缺乏市场纪律的贷款者。在国家和实质性的国有银行部门,还会有显著的溢出效应。这都会阻碍私营中小企业贷款机构因“挤出”效应,而得不到国有机构的贷款补助。

研究发现,一般表现典型个体的国有银行效率,是相对国有银行的股票所有权的,这通常伴随不利的宏观经济后果(如,克拉克20xx年,Lopez-de-Silanes、Shleifer 2002、巴特、Caprio20xx年,哈桑·莱文伯杰、Klapper伯杰、克拉克20xx年,Udell、科勒、Klapper)。也有证据表明, 与大型国有银行相比,不少的一般中小企业信用是在国家市场份额上(例如,Beck、Demirguc-Kunt,20xx年,Klapper伯杰,20xx年)。不良贷款利率也一样,国有银行往往是很高的,符合贷款给中小企业与负净现值的贷款(例如,汉森20xx年,克拉克,伯杰、Udell、科勒、Klapper)。这些结果符合国家控制的影响的研究,在发达国家银行的私有化(例如,Verbrugge,欧文斯20xx年,Otchere,20xx年)和发展中国家(例如,克拉克,筛选、Megginson)通常发现消除国有股性能的方面改进。类似的情况,对外资机构和国有机构可能普遍使用交易的技术,但很少有资讯技术或资料来推断这些技术。

D.市场集中度

更大的金融机构市场集中可以减少或增加信贷中小企业信用可用。在传统的“结构产生效率”的假说中,注意力更集中在减少通过任何贷款信用接入技术。这种情况可能会出现在几个方面为机构更集中更大的市场,可以行使权力市场。这些机构可以选择通过提高利润更高的利率贷款或费用。他们可以选择中小型企业降低风险监管负担,或由信贷紧缩标准为中小型企业。或者他们可以选择在发现或服务侵袭性较小,利用中小企业信用的“安静的生活”给经理市场的力量。另外,机构可以增加更多的集中的市场中小企业信贷渠道,用贷款技术、关系型贷款。更大

15

西安交通大学城市学院本科生毕业设计(论文)

的力度可以鼓励投资借贷机构之间的关系,因为中小企业不太可能找到替代能源的未来。市场力量帮助机构实行长期隐含的借款人接收津贴的利率在短期内,然后补偿制度的更高的后期的市场竞争率(夏普19xx年,拉詹1995)。

尽管这两种理论都可以同时申请,实证研究达成共识,而这些可以支配的经验,提供给中小企业信用较低或高集中度的市场。一些研究发现使用美国数据SCP假说,可以得出更高的集中度与中小企业贷款利率(例如,19xx年, Udell罗森博格,20xx年)。尽管这一发现可以支持这项假设,它也可以是符合假设的扩张的关系,如贷款借贷关系往往比交易具有更高的利率贷款。关系贷款不需要拥有更高的平均速率,但我们不能排除这种可能性。与上面的实证研究相比,外资企业和大型国有企业、私营机构和国营机构,都有很难解释的影响,是因为在借贷市场集中度技术通常没被注意到。

最近的一些研究,测试了这些假设影响的中小企业和一般的经济效益以及金融市场集中度和其它指标等市场监管的限制竞争(部分借贷的基础上进一步探讨)。一些研究发现,高的不利影响的金融市场集中度和限制竞争(例如,Jayaratne和Strahan 1998、布莱克和Strahan 20xx年,哈桑·伯杰,Klapper 20xx年),还存在一些有利的影响(例如,银行集中度和拉詹19xx年,Cetorelli和Gambera 20xx年,Zarutskie 20xx年,Cetorelli 20xx年,Bonaccorsi迪帕蒂与戴尔'Ariccia)。还有一些发现,不同的贷款基础设施、经济环境也可能产生影响(例如,DeYoung、戈德堡·怀特,19xx年,Demirguc、Kunt·贝克,20xx年)。

节选自:第五届世界银行会议上的关于克服制约中小企业发展的报告,

16

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